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I trodu tio
The quality of employment available to Ontarians is a growing concern among legislators,
policymakers, and the general public alike. There is widespread recognition that precarious
employment and the challenges posed by the associated realignment of risks, costs and power
relations between employees and employers require improvements to e plo ees legislati e
protection. O ta io s Cha gi g Wo kpla es ‘e ie (CWR) affords us an opportunity to take
sto k of i po ta t ha ges taki g pla e the p o i e s la ou market. As the Terms of
Reference introduced at the outset of the CWR note, fa too a
o ke s a e e pe ie i g
1
g eate p e a ious ess in employment in Ontario today than in the recent past. Accordingly,
ith the ai of eati g de e t o k i O ta io, pa ti ula l [fo ] those ho ha e ee
ade
vulnerable by changes in our e o o a d o kpla es, 2 such terms directed the Special
Advisors to investigate the dynamics underlying the magnitude of precariousness in the
p o i e s la ou a ket and to pose options for mitigating this fundamental social and
economic problem through efo s to O ta io s Labour Relations Act (LRA) and Employment
Standards Act (ESA).
Charged with these objectives, the Special Advisors have commissioned studies and solicited
public input on the parameters of their investigations as well as on the appropriate content to
be covered in their review. The result is arguably one of the most thorough legislative reviews
of the LRA and the ESA undertaken in recent decades. Reflecting the CWR s i pa t to date,
partly on the basis of its findings on this domain, the P e ie s Ma date Lette of September
2016 to the Minister of Labour, the Hon. Kevin Flynn, calls for st e gthe ing enforcement of
employment standards, through further resources if necessary, ensuring employers who do not
respect protections for workers are held to account. 3
Against this backdrop, this research brief responds to the request for input on options set out in
the Interim Report on the CWR fo efo i g O ta io s LRA and ESA. It is the product of the
collective efforts of researchers affiliated with Closi g the E plo e t “ta da ds
E fo e e t Gap: I p o i g P ote tio s fo People i P e a ious Jo s, a ulti-year research
partnership – now in its fourth year – supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada, and involving researchers from eight universities, an international

1

Ontario Ministry of Labour (2016) Terms of Reference - Changing Workplaces Review. Online:
https://www.labour.gov.on.ca/english/about/workplace/terms.php
2
Ibid.
3
Government of Ontario (2016) September 2016 Mandate letter: Labour. Online:
https://www.ontario.ca/page/september-2016-mandate-letter-labour

3

advisory team of academic experts drawn from Australia, the United States, and parts of
Europe, and numerous organizations and agencies outside the academy.
Closi g the E plo e t “ta da ds E fo e e t Gap is p e ised o t o guidi g
assumptions: first, that Ontario s ESA, in establishing minimum workplace conditions related to
wages, hours of work, overtime pay, vacations, public holidays, and termination and severance,
is the foremost vehicle for extending entitlements to all Ontario employees regardless of their
bargaining power in the labour market. It thereby reflects a collectively-established, normative
judgment about minimally decent working arrangements that must be provided. Its second
overarching assumption, i fo i g pa ti ipa ts su sta ti e esea h fo us, is that if
employment standards (E“ a e to p o ide a floo of so ial i i a elo
hi h O ta io s
employees shall not fall, employees must be able to effectively access the rights to which they
are legally entitled. For this reason, the ESA creates statutory rights enforceable by the state and
thus positions state officials as those who bear principal responsibility for the Act s enforcement
and provides them with a range of enforcement tools.
Given these guiding premises, the ensuing brief focuses principally on responding to issues and
options raised by the Special Advisors that relate to ES and their enforcement (i.e., the ESA). At
the same time, it also addresses select issues and options pertinent to improving conditions for
vulnerable employees in precarious employment that lie at the interface of the LRA and the
ESA, specifically, access to collective bargaining and thus broader-based bargaining and
employee voice. The rationale for this supplemental emphasis is that, as research shows,
expanding access to representation through unions and collective bargaining among vulnerable
employees in precarious employment is integral to improving their working conditions.
The material cited in the brief draws on research findings of Closing the Employment
“ta da ds E fo e e t Gap to date, evidence from other jurisdictions, and secondary
scholarly literature and policy analysis. Most of the issues addressed are either outlined in
Chapter 5 of the Interim Report or raised in Chapter 4 but pertain to the relationship between
aspects of the LRA and the ESA. To facilitate easy cross-referencing, the brief adopts the section
numbering of the Interim Report.
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Part I: Respo ses to Optio s Posed i Chapter o E ploy e t
Sta dards
5.2.1 Scope and Coverage of the ESA: Misclassification of Employees and the Definition of
Employees
Background:
Like all protective labour and employment statutes, the ESA defines to whom it applies and to
whom it does not. In the case of the ESA, the statute applies to a e plo ee a d his o he
e plo e p o ided that the o k is to be performed in Ontario or, if outside, is a continuation
of the work performed in Ontario.4 While the legislative choice to limit the scope of coverage to
employees goes back to the origins of the ESA, it is neither natural nor neutral. This is because
workers sell their services in the labour market under a variety of contractual forms, including
as employees and as self-employed workers or independent contractors, and so it is a policy
choice whether or not to cover all workers, as does the Occupational Health and Safety Act
(OHSA), or a subset of workers, as does the ESA.
However, as the Special Advisors recognize, the choice to only cover employees and not all
workers does not resolve the issue of coverage fully; indeed it generates problems of its own.
First and foremost, by constituting in law that employees are entitled to a different set of rights
than other workers, the policy choice not only affirms that employers enjoy the power to
substitute contracting for employment, it attaches a particular set of legal consequences to that
choice that may create incentives to contract rather than employ that would not otherwise
exist. The Special Advisors have not chosen to inquire into whether this choice is justified, but
rather have elected to accept it and consider options for dealing with its consequences. These
consequences are, first, the problem of definition (who constitutes covered employees) and,
second, the problem of enforcement (how to ensure that covered employees are not deprived
of their ESA entitlements through being misclassified).
The difficulty of resolving these twin problems has increased as a result of the changing
workplace. As the Special Advisors discuss in the Interim Report, many employers are under
increasing competitive pressure that has contributed to the erosion of the standard
employment relationship and greater reliance on novel and often more precarious contracts for
the performance of work that do not clearly fall within the traditional legal parameters of
4

The policy options that respond to concerns about the exclusions of certain groups of employees from coverage
and of exemptions and special rules are addressed in the response to 5.2.3 in this brief.
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employment, making it more difficult to define and determine who is covered by the ESA. As
well, some employers have responded to increased competitive pressure by misclassifying
employees as excluded workers in order to evade their legal obligations and reduce their labour
costs.
Not only do the growing problems of definition and misclassification have common causes, they
are mutually reinforcing. The erosion of the standard employment relationship makes it
increasingly difficult to provide a bright line definition of employment, which in turn produces
an environment in which misclassification, innocent or intentional, may increase. Employers
may not fully understand where the boundaries of employment end and self-employment
begin. They may feel emboldened to intentionally misclassify employees because they perceive
that the risk of being caught is reduced since their employees do not understand their legal
status, are too vulnerable to complain, or that the official test for determining employee status
is open-ended and hard for officials to apply.
Employee misclassification is recognized as a pervasive and serious problem in many
jurisdictions. For example, in the United States, recent studies estimate that between 10% and
20% of employers misclassify at least one of their employees as an independent contractor, and
that misclassification is likely increasing.5 Misclassification imposes costs on workers by
depriving them of access to workplace standards. It also makes the playing field uneven, which
in turn may encourage more employers to abandon standard employment relationships and
avoid or evade the ESA in order to remain competitive. Yet misclassification is not just a
problem under the ESA. Misclassified employees a e dep i ed of o ke s o pe satio ,
employment insurance, and other employment-related benefits. As well, misclassification
deprives government of payroll and income taxes that should be paid. Indeed, studies focussing
on the case of the United States estimate that such losses in government revenue are in the
billions of dollars, and thus efforts to detect and remedy misclassification have been increased.6
Ca é, F a çoise
I depe de t Co t a to Mis lassifi atio . Washi gto : E o o i Poli I stitute
Briefing Paper. Online: http://www.epi.org/files/pdf/87595.pdf, p. 1; see also Donahue, Linda H., James Ryan
Lamare, and Fred B. Kotler (2007) The Cost of Worker Misclassification in New York State. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University, School of Industrial and Labor Relations. Online:
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/reports/9/; La Co
issio of O ta io
Vul e a le Wo ke s a d
P e a ious Wo k: Fi al ‘epo t. O li e: http://www.lco-cdo.org/vulnerable-workers-final-report.pdf, p. 95; Smith,
Rebecca, David Bensman, a d Paul Ale a de Ma
The Big Rig: Poverty, Pollution, and the
Mis lassifi atio of T u k D i e s at A e i a s Po ts. O li e:
http://nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/03/PovertyPollutionandMisclassification.pdf
6
Department for Professional Employees, AFL-CIO
The Mis lassifi atio of E plo ees as I depe de t
Co t a to s. O li e: http://dpeaflcio.org/wp-content/uploads/Misclassification-of-Employees-2016.pdf, pp. 6-7;
5
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Misclassification of Employees
Option 1: Maintain the status quo
The first option is to maintain the status quo, but the Interim Report does not identify precisely
what the status quo is, and so it is necessary to begin there. Misclassification in and of itself is
not a violation of the ESA; rather a violation occurs when the employer fails to provide an
employee with a minimum standard required by the Act. As a result, disputes about
misclassification arise when employers are alleged to have violated a standard either as a result
of a complaint7 or an Employment Standards Officer (ESO) inspection. The status quo with
regard to misclassification, therefore, is one in which the issue only gets raised if a worker
makes a complaint alleging that he or she is an employee who is being deprived of the
protection of the ESA or if an ESO conducts an inspection in which he or she makes an
assessment that one or more workers is an employee whose ESA entitlements are being
violated. Misclassification as such is not the direct target of enforcement.
Because misclassification is not itself a violation of the ESA, the E plo e t “ta da ds B a h s
administrative database (ESIS) provides no direct information on the number of cases which
involve employee misclassification. However, research indicates that the present regime fails to
adequately protect employees against the risk of being misclassified for two principal reasons:
first, to the extent that detection of misclassification depends on employee complaints, it will
result in significant under-enforcement. The reasons for under-enforcement are discussed at
length in Section 5.5.4 of this brief).8 Second, it is likely the case that many workers who are
told by their employers that they are not employees, and therefore not entitled to ESA
minimums, may not be aware that they may, in fact, be employees as a matter of law and that
they could challenge their classification and claim their ESA entitlements. These problems are
greatest among those employees who are most vulnerable because of their social location or
context.

U.“. T easu , T easu I spe to Ge e al fo Ta Ad i ist atio
E plo e s Do Not Al a s Follo I te al
‘e e ue “e i e Wo ke Dete i atio ‘uli gs. ‘ef.
-30-058.
7
In this analysis, to enhance precision, and following the convention of other scholars working in this area
i te atio all , the te
o plai t is used to efe to the e ti e su issio
ade a e plo ee to the
Ministry of Labour. Each complaint includes o e o o e lai s hi h efe to alleged iolatio s of pa ti ula
employment standards.
8
Vosko, Leah F., Andrea M. Noack, and Eric Tu ke
E plo e t “ta da ds E fo e e t: A “ a of
Employment Standards Complaints and Workplace Inspections and Their Resolution under the Employment
“ta da ds A t,
. O li e: https://cirhr.library.utoronto.ca/sites/cirhr.library.utoronto.ca/files/researchprojects/Vosko%20Noack%20Tucker-%206A%20-ESA%20Enforcement.pdf
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Proactive enforcement may also lead to the detection of misclassification, but the actual target
of proactive inspections is employer violations of substantive standards. In recent years, the
Ministry of Labour (MOL) has adopted a strategy of blitzes that target sectors where violations
are suspected to be more frequent or groups of employees who are perceived to be more at
risk. For example, there have been several blitzes targeting precarious employment, vulnerable
and temporary foreign employees. I su h litzes, E“Os ta get o e sta da ds, su h as e o dkeeping and hours of work, but do not seem to focus on misclassification as such, although
presumably the sectors and groups of workers selected are likely to also be disproportionally
sites where misclassification is more prevalent. But even if misclassification is detected in such
contexts, it has no direct consequences. Most employers will simply be ordered to comply with
the standards they have violated, a few may face minor penalties through tickets or notices of
contravention, and even fewer will be prosecuted for regulatory offences (usually only in cases
where they refuse to comply with orders to pay) but these penalties will be imposed because of
the substantive violation, not because of the misclassification. To our knowledge, no employer
has ever been sanctioned or prosecuted for the misclassification itself.
For these reasons, maintaining the status quo is not a satisfactory response to the problem of
misclassification, and we do not recommend option 1.
Option 2: Increase education of workers and employers with respect to rights and obligations
No one can object to increasing the education of employees and employers with respect to
their rights and obligations under the ESA. First, with regard to employer education,
undoubtedly, some proportion of misclassification is the result of innocent error by employers
who erroneously believe that some workers are not covered employees. Thus, reducing the
frequency of these errors through employer education will be beneficial. The important
question, however, is whether employer education by itself can be expected to be an adequate
response to the problem of misclassification. There is no empirical evidence on the frequency
of misclassification in Ontario or on the proportion of misclassification that is innocent.
However, studies from other jurisdictions, most notably the United States,9 suggest that a
significant proportion of misclassification is intentional and promoted by the structural
pressures described earlier.
With regard to worker education, it is also undoubtedly true that some unknown proportion of
the workforce does not understand the law regarding employee status and therefore may
accept the designation they are given by their employers as determinative of their legal status.
For a recent review of the U“ lite atu e o the p e ale e of
Co t a to Mis lassifi atio .

9

is lassifi atio , see Ca é, I depe de t

8

However, as discussed above, there is clear evidence that labour force participants do not
assert their rights not simply because of a lack of knowledge, but also because of the fear they
will suffer adverse employment consequences.
Therefore, while option 2 may contribute to a solution, research indicates that education on its
own is unlikely to reduce substantially the level of misclassification.
Option 3: Focus proactive enforcement activities on the identification and rectification of cases
of misclassification
Proactive inspection aimed at misclassification would be a beneficial policy option. However,
the more important question is how that might be undertaken. As noted, the ESA does not
specifically make misclassification a violation of the Act and there are no administrative records
which identify when, where or how often misclassification occurs. The absence of data makes it
difficult to target misclassification as an enforcement priority. We simply do not know, for
example, what percent of employees who suffer minimum wage or vacation pay violations do
so because they are misclassified by their employers. One way to begin to address this problem
is to amend the ESA to make misclassification a separate and distinct offence. Not only would
such a measure make it clear to employers that misclassification is itself a wrong for which they
may be sanctioned (in addition to being ordered to pay what they owe), it would also begin to
generate much-needed administrative data on misclassification that could be used to better
target enforcement resources toward its elimination.
Additionally, in the United States, inter-agency taskforces and commissions have been
established at the federal and state levels to coordinate and strengthen enforcement. A similar
approach could be considered for Ontario.10 This might include agreements at the provincial
level, such as an agreement between the Employment Standards Branch and the Workplace
Safety and Insurance Board, as well as agreements with federal bodies such as the Canada
Revenue Agency.
Finally, as part of a proactive approach to enforcing misclassifications, the Special Advisors
might also consider proposing that intentional misclassification should be singled out for more
stringent penalties, such as an obligation to pay affected workers double what they are owed,
or to pay elevated fines. For example, Califo ia s Employee Misclassification Act, which
a e ded the state s la o ode, le ies su sta tial fi es o e plo e s fou d guilt of illful
Vosko, Leah F. et al
Ne App oa hes to E fo e e t a d Co plia e ith La ou ‘egulato
“ta da ds. O li e: http://www.lco-cdo.org/vulnerable-workers-commissioned-papers-vosko-tucker-thomasgellatly.pdf, pp. 67–68.
10
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misclassification of employees as independent contractors. These include a civil penalty
between $5,000 and $15,000 USD for each violation which can be increased to $10,000 and to
$25,000 USD if the activity is deemed to be repeated. The Act also mobilizes the threat of
reputational loss: it requires employers found to have misclassified workers to display a notice
o the o pa
e site, o i a othe p o i e t spa e, hi h i di ates that the La o a d
Wo kfo e De elop e t Age
o a ou t…has fou d that the pe so o e plo e has
committed a serious violation of the law by engaging in the willful misclassification of
employees. 11
Option 4: Provide in the ESA that in any case where there is a dispute about whether a person is
an employee, the employer has the burden of proving that the person is not an employee
covered by the ESA and/or has an obligation, similar to Section 1(5) of the LRA in relation to
related employers, to adduce all relevant evidence with regard to the matter
This is a relatively straightforward measure that could marginally improve the efficiency and
accuracy of decision-making. Placing the burden of proof on the employer (which requires the
employer to adduce evidence at the risk of failing to discharge the burden) and additionally
requiring the employer to adduce all relevant evidence in its possession should help to insure
that decision-makers have more of the relevant facts at their disposal.
The other potential effect of the proposal is to incrementally expand the scope of coverage
with regard to workers who are on the margin between employment and self-employment
because the test for who is an employee for the purposes of the ESA cannot produce a bright
line distinction between these two categories. Therefore, ESOs and other adjudicators always
have to make judgments about where to draw the line in a particular case. A shift in the burden
of proof onto employers should result in more of these marginal cases being decided in favour
of employee status, even in the absence of a change in the definition of employee. This is a
desirable outcome if we accept that an underlying policy goal for ES legislatio fa ou s a
presumption of broad o e age. 12
An even stronger measure that also does not require a change in the definition of employee
would be to create a legal presumption of employee status for workers performing or providing
11

California Labor Code S. 226.8(1). In addition, the Act allows for fines to be levied against any third party advisors
su h as a a ou ta t o hu a esou e p ofessio al ut ot atto e s ho k o i gl ad ises a e plo e to
is lassif a i di idual as a i depe de t o t a to to a oid e plo ee status (California Labor Code S. 2753).
12
Arthurs, Harry (2006) Fairness at Work: Federal Labour Standards for the 21 st Century. Gatineau,
QC: Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, p. 59.
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labour services for a fee. The effect of a legal presumption of employment status is to shift the
burden of proof onto employers, but unlike option 4, the issue is not posed as an evidentiary
matter that arises only in the context of a dispute. Rather, it states a more general principle in
favour of coverage. To strengthen the presumption, the law may also specify what the
employer must demonstrate to overcome the presumption. Twenty-seven American states
ha e hat is alled the ABC test,13 which requires employers to show:
(a) an individual is free from control or direction over performance of the work, both
under contract and in fact;
(b) the service provided is outside the usual course of the business for which it is
performed; and
(c) an individual is customarily engaged in an independently established trade,
occupation, or business.
The articulation of factors that must be established to rebut the presumption of employee
status, however, begins to touch on the question of definition, the issue to which we now turn.
Definition of Employee in the ESA
Option 5: Maintain the status quo
As the Interim Report makes clear, the status quo is unsatisfactory. Employment and
independent contracting do not exist as discrete categories separated by a bright line but
rather are endpoints on a spectrum of work arrangements. The existence of this spectrum is
not new but recent developments such as cybernetics that have lowered the cost of
contracting14 and facilitated the proliferation of platform work and other innovative
arrangements that challenge existing legal categories. As a result, the difficulty of distinguishing
between covered employees and other workers has grown.
The statutory definition of employee under the ESA is rudimentary, but the problem of
determining who is or is not an employee is not unique to this context. In an effort to apply a
categorical distinction to complex factual arrangements, adjudicators have adopted multifactor tests that look at such things as control, ownership of tools, chance of profit etc., while
Leberstein, Sarah and Catherine Ruckelshaus (May,
I depe de t Co t a to s. E plo ee. Ne Yo k:
National Employment Law Project, Policy Brief. Online: http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Policy-BriefIndependent-Contractor-vs-Employee.pdf
14
Dyer-Witheford, Nick (2015) Cyber-Proletariat: Global Labour in the Digital Vortex. London: Pluto Press.
13

11

a k o ledgi g the e is o conclusive test which can be universally applied to determine
hethe a pe so is a e plo ee o a i depe de t o t a to . 15 Arguably, one potential
benefit of a multi-factor test is that it can be applied flexibly to ensure that the purposes of the
ESA are achieved. However, there is a limit to how far a purposive application of a multi-factor
test can go if the underlying statutory categories no longer fit the reality in which it operates.
This is the case with the ESA.
Option 6: Include a dependent contractor provision in the ESA, and consider making clear that
regulations could be passed, if necessary, to exempt particular dependent contractors from a
regulation or to create a different standard that would apply to some dependent contractors
We recommend the creation of a dependent contractor provision in the ESA. Such a provision
would be a positive step that responds to the reality that work arrangements exist on a
continuum and that the traditional category of employee may not adequately capture the full
range of workers who are in need of statutory protection against unacceptable forms of work16
or working conditions.17 The effect of such a measure would be to extend outwards the
boundaries of protection, but the actual effect of such a measure will depend on its
implementation. In other areas of the law, particularly labour relations, where dependent
contractor provisions are common, the application of the provision depends on its
interpretation and application by adjudicators who face the same problems that arise in the
i te p etatio a d appli atio of the te
e plo ee ut at a new margin. There is no bright
line that differentiates dependent from independent contractors and so multi-factor tests are
adopted and usually applied purposively, to include workers who are in a relation of economic
dependence with the party to whom they perform work or provide service for compensation.
Not surprisingly, almost all disputes about coverage take place at the new margin. Therefore, it
is crucial that careful consideration be given to how best to define dependent contractor and
provide clear guidance to employers and adjudicators about the scope and purpose of the
dependent contractor category. In regard to the definition, there is much to be said in favour of
replicating the definition in the LRA, both because that definition emphasizes the importance of
economic dependence and because a different definition of the term is likely to create
15

671122 Ontario Ltd. v Sagaz Industries Canada Inc. [2001] 2 S.C.R. 983, para. 46.
For a recent discussion of the parameters of this emerging principle, see Fudge, Judy and Deidre McCann (2015)
U a epta le Fo s of Wo k: A Glo al a d Co pa ati e “tud Ge e a, I te atio al La ou O ga izatio .
Online: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/documents/publication/wcms_436165.pdf
17
The La Co
issio of O ta io Vul e a le Wo ke s a d P e a ious Wo k: Fi al ‘epo t, has recommended
e te di g so e E“A p ote tio s to self- employed persons in dependent working relationships with one client,
focussing on low wage earners, and/or identifying other options for responding to their need for employment
sta da ds p ote tio , p. 95.
16
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unnecessary confusion. Consideration should also be given to issuing administrative guidelines
similar to those issued in regard to the identification of employees misclassified as independent
contractors by the U.S. Department of Labor s Wage and Hour Division (WHD), in 2015.18
Finally, consideration should be given to creating regulatory power to deem particular groups
of workers to be dependent contractors. This would enable the government to expand the
scope of coverage without having to amend the ESA in the event that the adjudicatory process
fails appropriately to do so.
The final issue is whether there should be the power to tailor the application of the ESA to fit
the specific circumstances of particular groups of dependent contractors and whether
regulations are the best way to accomplish this. However, no explanation is provided as to why
the issue of special rules and exemptions should be treated differently for dependent
contractors than for employees and we cannot think of one. Past experience with special rules
and exemptions suggests great caution should be taken in this regard. Elsewhere in the Interim
Report, options are presented for the review of existing special rules and for the creation of
new ones, including the MOL s current Special Industry Rules (SIRs) process. We see no reason
why any tailoring of the ESA for dependent contractors should take place through the creation
of a separate regulatory power, especially one that lacks an articulated set of principles to guide
decision-makers and that does not guarantee the participation of workers in the decisionmaking process.

5.2.2 Who is the Employer and Scope of Liability
Background:
Just as labour and employment laws create rights for employees, they also impose correlative
duties and therefore must identify who is responsible for their fulfillment. Traditionally, the
answer was obvious: the direct employer owed the duty to comply with the minimum
standards and could be held liable for failing to do so. However, as the Special Advisors
recognize, the changing workplace has resulted in a fissuring of what were formally integrated
employing entities through sub-contracting, franchising, supply-chains, and use of temporary
help agencies, among other mechanisms. These arrangements often create conditions that are
conducive to ES violations and also pose challenges to effective enforcement, raising the
question of whether it is adequate to impose duties only on direct employers narrowly
U.“. Depa t e t of La o , Wage a d Hou Di isio WHD Ad i ist ato s I te p etatio No.
- Issued
July 15, 2015 by David Weil, Administrator). Online: https://www.dol.gov/whd/workers/Misclassification/AI2015_1.pdf
18
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conceived or whether the definition of the employer should be expanded or other entities be
made jointly responsible for the duties imposed on the direct employer.
This is not the first time the issue has come up and as the Special Advisors note there are
precedents in the ESA for imposing duties more broadly. For example, shareholder and
subsequently director liability for unpaid wages dates back to the first general incorporation
statutes.19 Related employer provisions are also a longstanding feature of ES statutes and more
recently client liability for non-payment by temporary help agencies (THAs) (the legal employer)
were added.20 These extensions of liability cover diverse situations. There are nevertheless at
least three common characteristics that can be derived from them that help establish
normative principles for holding an entity jointly responsible for the legal emplo e s o compliance with its ESA responsibilities. First, there is a causal contribution insofar as the nonemploying entity has entered into an arrangement that increases the risk of violations or
undermines effective enforcement; second, the non-employing entity has benefited from the
arrangement economically; and, third, the non-employing entity has the capacity to rectify the
problem by insisting on contractual terms that hold the immediate employer responsible for
complying with the ESA.21
Option 1: Maintain the status quo
We do not recommend the option of maintaining the status quo because it is inadequate to
deal with the full range of organizational arrangements into which businesses enter that should
be captured by the principles articulated above. In short, the current law is under-inclusive and
as a result creates an uneven playing field which creates incentives to enter into particular
arrangements because they enable one party to avoid legal duties under the ESA.
Option 2: Contractor Liability
Contractor liability has a long history and has been used in a variety of situations. For example,
beginning the late-nineteenth century, governments were made liable for the unpaid wage
Tu ke , E i
“ha eholde a d Di e to Lia ilit fo U paid Wo ke s Wages i Ca ada: F o Co ditio of
G a ti g Li ited Lia ilit to E eptio al ‘e ed . Law and History Review 26(1): 57-97.
20
The Go e
e t of O ta io s Stronger Workplaces for a Stronger Economy Act, 2014, amended the ESA to
extend joint and several liabilities to client firms for unpaid wages, overtime pay, public holiday pay and premium
pay. See ESA s. 74.18.1.
21
For a more expansive discussion of these and other principles justifying the imposition of liability, see Davidov,
Gu
I di e t E plo e t: “hould Lead Co pa ies e Lia le? Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal
37(5): 18-29.
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liabilities of their o t a to s o pu li o ks p oje ts.22 Not only is there precedent for
holding contractors liable for the wage liabilities of sub-contractors, but more importantly the
imposition of such liability is justified according to the principles we have identified. It is well
documented that sub-contra ti g i eases the isk that o ke s ights ill e iolated;23 subcontracting arrangements produce economic benefits for the contracting firm, and contracting
firms have the capacity to remedy the problem. Moreover, the imposition of liability on
contractors for ESA violations by sub-contractors does not interfere with the freedom of
businesses to organize their activities through sub-contracting where it is advantageous for
them to do so; it merely prevents them from gaining in addition immunity from liability for ESA
violations by adopting this form.
The Special Advisors raise the possibility that contractors should be legislatively compelled to
require their sub-contractors to comply with the law. We recommend such a measure as a
means of fostering compliance among employers along the supply chain, and enhancing the
ability of aggrieved employees of sub-contractors to recoup back wages. We do not see any
reason for limiting contractor liability to particular sectors or industries where vulnerable
employees and precarious jobs are commonplace. The problem with such an approach is that it
risks creating a regime that will need to be periodically re-evaluated to ensure that its coverage
is appropriate as the work arrangements vary over time in economic sectors. Moreover, given
that the potential costs of joint liability are low for companies that operate in sectors where ES
violations are infrequent, the complexity and inefficiency of creating sector specific liability is
not justified. For these reasons, we recommend the adoption of contractor liability across all
sectors.
Option 3: Create a joint employer test akin to the DOL Policy
While option 2 essentially involves imposing joint liability on one entity for the violations of
another entity that is the legal employer, option 3 provides a remedy based on an expanded
definition of who is the legal employer. In effect, it would extend employer status to joint
employers based on an economic realities test. We would therefore recommend such a
measure. If it is the case that the economic reality of the situation is that more than one entity
is directing, controlling or supervising the work and is in control of the employment conditions

22

For example, see S.C. 1896. c. 5.
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etc., then both those entities should be held jointly and severally liable for complying with the
ESA.
However, while we believe that the measure is justified, we would see its role as a secondary
one, to fill the gaps not covered by option 2 (contractor liability) and option 4 (franchisor
liability). (We would also urge that the Special Advisors seriously consider the option of creating
supply chain liability. A growing body of literature points to the effectiveness of such measures
in fostering compliance at the bottom of supply chains.24)
Contractor, franchisor and supply chain liability provisions are more categorical in their
approach and thus easier to apply.25 The frequency of disputes about whether the parties are in
a sub-contracting or franchising arrangement is likely to be low compared to the level of
litigation that is likely to arise about whether two entities are joint employers based on a multifactor test. Moreover, a categorical approach is less amenable to gaming and manipulation.
That said, a categorical approach cannot capture all situations in which the imposition of joint
liability is justified, and so a more open-ended joint-employer test is also required.
Option 4: Franchisor Liability
Like contractor liability (option 2), franchisor liability is justified on the basis of the normative
principles articulated above. As Weil26 shows, there is a causal relation between franchising and
an increased risk of employment standards violations; franchisors economically benefit from
the arrangement and are in a position to rectify the situation. With regard to the last point,
franchisors are in an extremely strong position to minimize the risk that their franchisees will
violate their ES obligations. Franchise agreements impose detailed requirements on franchisees
and control how they conduct their businesses in minute detail in order to ensure that
customers will have the same experience in every franchised location and to protect the brand.
In this context, it should not be difficult for franchisors to include requirements regarding ESA
compliance in the franchise agreement as well as to provide the franchisor with remedies
against the franchisee in the event on an ESA violation for which it is jointly liable. Finally, the
imposition of joint liability does not in any way limit the freedom of businesses to organize as a
Ha d , Tess a d Joh Ho e
Chai ‘ea tio : A “t ategi App oa h to Add essing Employment NonCo plia e i Co ple “uppl Chai s. Journal of Industrial Relations 57(4): 563-584; Locke, Richard M. (2013) The
Promise and Limits of Private Power: Promoting Labor Standards in a Global Economy. Cambridge: Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press; Weil, The Fissured Workplace.
25
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franchised business in order to obtain their legitimate benefits. What it prevents is lead
businesses from gaining the additional advantage of gaining immunity from ESA violations
through franchising. For these reasons, we recommend option 4.
Optio

: Repeal the intent or effe t requirement for related employers

The related employer provision is generally applied to another categorical situation, one in
which a corporation operates through a number of subsidiary corporations. The question is
when the parent or one of its subsidiaries should be held liable for the ESA violations of another
subsidiary. Related employer provisions in most jurisdictions simply require that the businesses
a e asso iated o elated. O ta io is u i ue i also e ui i g that the i te t o effe t of the
arrangement directly or indirectly defeats the purpose of the Act. We would argue that this
e ui e e t is al a s fulfilled he e the arrangement of businesses in that manner deprives
employees of the ability to access the deeper pockets of the broader business to secure their
monetary entitlements. More generally, if we turn to our three normative principles for
imposing broader liability, there is a causal contribution between the business arrangement
and the risk of violation or the avoidance of liability; lead businesses benefit from such
arrangements and they are in a position to rectify the problem. Moreover, as is the case for
contractor and franchisor liability, related employer liability does not limit the freedom of
businesses to organize through subsidiaries, it merely removes the advantage of gaining
immunity for ESA violations in one part of the business.
Unfortunately, the Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) has adopted a narrower
i te p etatio of the i te t o effe t e ui e e t that i poses a o e st i ge t ausatio
test in order to establish related employer liability. The implementation of this interpretation
has resulted in employees who have suffered significant monetary violations being unable to
collect what they are owed despite the fact that the parent corporation or one of its
subsidiaries continues to operate. In our view, this is a case where a categorical approach is
justified and this is best achieved by the repeal of the i te t a d effe t e ui e e t.
Therefore, we recommend option 5.
Optio

: Create a a alogy to the oppressio re edy

Our understanding is that a broad related employer provision would cover many situations that
an oppression remedy might be used to address, particularly if a remedy is being sought against
another corporate entity that is related to the employing corporation. However, it is also our
understanding that the oppression remedy may be used to impose liability on directors for the
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debts of the corporation.27 While it is not clear whether the Special Advisors contemplate
imposing liability through this new oppression remedy, we would strongly recommend that
they do so and that they also consider the option of expanding director liability to include
unpaid termination and severance pay.
Option 7: Liens
While this option has less to do with the scope of liability than the previous ones, we
recommend it, as it would provide an additional tool to improve the collection of monetary
violations. This issue is discussed elsewhere in our response (see response 5.5.7 on Collections,
options 2 and 3).
Option 8: Encourage best practices through government leading by example
This option is clearly sensible. As the government aims to be a model employer, it should be
standard practice for it to lead by example in all of its activities (see response to 5.5.5.3 on
Remedies and Penalties, option 11).

5.2.3 Exemptions, Special Rules and General Process
Background:
The ESA is intended to establish minimum working conditions and terms of employment in
Ontario. As the Special Advisors note, the Act and its regulations include a complex web of
more than 85 exemptions, partial exemptions, and qualifying conditions, which limit the
application of ES.28 Many exemptions are decades old and have persisted through multiple
iterations of the Act.
The Interim Report divides existing exemptions into three distinct categories, and the Special
Advisors are seeking public input on the alternatives proposed for each category, which we
offer below.

27

For example, see Downtown Eatery (1993) Ltd. v. Ontario, [2001] O.J. No. 1879 (ONCA), in which the oppression
remedy was used to find two corporate directors personally liable for the unpaid termination pay owed by the
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Guiding Principles
Before addressing the specifics of each category, some guiding principles for assessing ES
coverage and exemptions must be established. These principles emanate, in part, from the
Interim Report. For instance, the Special Advisors assert that, since exemptions normally reduce
or curtail rights,29 the E“A should e applied to as a e plo ees as possi le a d that
depa tu es f o , o odifi atio s to, the o should e li ited a d justifia le. 30 This goal of
universal, or near-universal, coverage supports an approach whereby the default position is
that exemptions should be eliminated unless an employer can clearly establish a case for their
retention. Globally, ES researchers note that modified or curtailed access to ES protections is a
feature of precarious employment.31
The Interim Report is mandated to pay particular attention to workers in precarious
employment, and to those workers who are made vulnerable by labour market changes and
disparities. Any assessment of exemptions should thus seek to attend to whether they have the
potential to adversely affect workers who have been historically disadvantaged in the labour
market, or who are becoming disadvantaged. By establishing social minima that workers –
particularly those in precarious employment – cannot fall below, Ontario establishes itself as a
jurisdiction that is committed and attentive to the maintenance of human rights and Charter
protections against discrimination.
In addition, as established by the SIRs process, a core principle for justifying an exemptions is
that the atu e of o k is su h that appl i g a sta da d ould p e lude a pa ti ula t pe of
work from being done at all or would significantly alter its output; the work could not continue
to e ist i a thi g lose to its p ese t fo . 32 Stringently applying this principle ensures
fairness for both employees and employers. As the MOL noted at its inception, the Act is
i te ded to safegua d o ke s agai st e ploitatio a d p ote t e plo e s agai st u fai
29

Ibid., p. 160.
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Europe. Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies; Vosko, Leah F. (2010) Managing the Margins: Gender,
Citizenship and the International Regulation of Precarious Employment. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
32
Mit hell a d Mu a , Cha gi g Wo kpla es ‘e ie , p.
.
30

19

o petitio ased o lo e sta da ds. 33 That is, employers should not gain a competitive
advantage by depriving employees of their rights, nor should they be undercut by competitors
who are exempt from employment standards.
Category 1: Existing exemptions that might be recommended for elimination or variation
without a further review
The Special Advisors have identified six current exemptions that might be dealt with in the
context of this review, and provided options relating to each one. In general, the principles
established above suggest that the option of maintaining the status quo is not appropriate.
Either the exemption should be removed or, at minimum, reviewed in relation to the principles
of universality, social minima, and fairness.
For residential care employees and residential building superintendents, janitors and caretakers,
we recommend the option to remove the exemptions and special rules. The limited data
available suggest that both of these groups of employees are likely to be precarious and
disadvantaged in the labour force. A small-scale survey of residential care employees in homes
for older people in Ontario and two other provinces finds that this work is highly gendered, and
that the women in these jobs were more likely to involuntarily be part-time employees, and
hold multiple jobs.34 Residential care employees in homes for children and the developmentally
handicapped, to whom these exemptions apply, may experience similar working conditions. A
qualitative study of apartment superintendents found that these low-status employees are left
in a position of perpetual insecurity and vulnerability, since they must negotiate the competing
de a ds of te a ts a d a age s, a d a age s k o ledge of thei o k is ofte de i ed
solely from tenant complaints.35
For the special minimum wage rates for students under 18 and the student exemption from the
three-hour rule , we recommend the options to eliminate the special rate and the exemption.
The special minimum wage rate for students under 18 amounts to a form of age discrimination
and should be eliminated on that basis. The student exemption from the three-hour rule relies
on a vague definition of student status, and thus potentially applies to anyone engaged in any
33
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type of formal learning. Most notably, both of these exemptions rest on criteria that are
inherent to an employee, and are not related to the nature of the work being performed.
Across Canada, student debt has grown substantially over time: in 2012, Ontario households
owed $12.3 billion in student loans, up 46% from 2005.36 Students studying in Ontario (and in
the Maritimes) graduate with higher average debt loads than students studying elsewhere in
Canada.37 Eliminating the student ESA exemptions would ensure that students earn wages
equal to other employees.
For the special minimum wage rate for liquor servers, we recommend the elimination of the
lower rate. Liquor servers in Ontario are overwhelmingly women and young people.38 They are
much more likely to live in low-income families and to hold multiple jobs.39 Approximately 20%
of liquor servers in Ontario do not earn the minimum wage, even after tips and commissions. 40
The recent passage of the Prote ti g E ployees’ Tips A t,
, which prohibits employers
f o taki g a po tio of a e plo ee s tips o othe g atuities, as well as the recent Ontario
government campaign to train bartenders and servers on how to manage incidents of sexual
harassment and violence involving colleagues and customers, highlights the precarious and
potentially unsafe nature of this work. At minimum, these employees should be compensated
at a rate that is equal to other Ontario employees.
For pharmacists, we recommend the removal of all exemptions. Like other health care
professionals (e.g., nurses, dieticians, and lab/radiation technicians), the special rule limiting
the e title e t to pe so al e e ge
lea e he e taki g the lea e ould o stitute a a t
of p ofessio al is o du t o a de eli tio of p ofessio al dut 41 should be retained. Little
research is available on Ontario pharmacists; but a recent survey of BC pharmacists – who are
not exempt from ES – shows that working time and quotas are a common concern.42 Almost a
“tatisti s Ca ada
“u e of Fi a ial “e u it ,
. O li e: http://www.statcan.gc.ca/dailyquotidien/140225/dq140225b-eng.htm
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third of BC pharmacists report working more than 40 hours a week, and about half of
pharmacists say they do not have adequate time for breaks/lunches.43 These strains were
particularly associated with workplaces that had monthly quotas for advanced pharmacy
services (e.g., immunizations or medication reviews), a situation which is more common among
retail chain pharmacies. Gi e pha a ists ha gi g o ki g o ditio s, the e o al of
exemptions related to working time particularly is important to ensure patient safety.
For information technology (IT) professionals, we recommend the removal of the exemptions
from overtime pay and all five of the standards relating to hours of work. The nature of the
work these employees perform is not precluded or significantly altered by adherence to
minimum ES. The substantial growth of employment in IT occupations is also worth noting. The
rate of employment growth for IT occupations in Ontario has vastly surpassed the rate of
employment growth overall since this exemption was established: from 2001 to 2011, there
was a 29% increase in employment levels for information systems analysts and consultants, and
a 55% increase in employment levels for computer and information systems managers,
compared to a 14% increase in employment levels for occupations overall.44 Whereas IT jobs
were previously clustered into specialized firms, these jobs are now embedded in a wide range
of firms and across many industries. IT employees deserve ES protection similar to their coworkers in other occupations.
Finally, for managers and supervisors, we recommend the option to further define the category
by retaining the exemption only for managers (not supervisors), whose primary duty must be
the performance of office or non-manual work directly related to the management or general
business operations of the employer or the emplo e s usto e s, a d ho ea
o e tha a
certain amount in wages/ salary. Managerial misclassification is a growing problem in the U.S.,45
a trend that prompted the Fair La or “ta dards A t’s FLSA) adoption of more stringent
evaluation criteria. Although Canadian data on managerial misclassification is not available, it is
likely that trends are similar here; in part, because many of the firms identified in U.S.
misclassification lawsuits also operate in Canada. These more stringent criteria would help to
ensure that only managers who truly have some control over their scheduling and working
time, and who are highly compensated, are covered by this exemption. Much like the updated
FLSA, the salary threshold should be set as a reasonably high percentile of the annual earnings
43
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for full-time salaried employees and be regularly updated. The application of a salary-plusduties app oa h i O ta io s a age ial e e ptio s ould i g the p o i e i to li e with
international best practices.
Category 2: Exemptions that we do not currently think warrant review and which should be
maintained
The Special Advisors identify six groups with exemptions established in 2005 or 2006 via the
SIRs process. Little information about the SIRs process is publicly available beyond that which is
described in the Interim Report. Several of the groups involved in the SIRs process are large
industrial sectors, with a wide diversity of employees and working conditions that can
substantially vary across employers and locations (e.g., automobile manufacturing, film and
television industries). It is not clear how the diversity of employees and employee groups was
consulted via this process. The outcome of the SIRs process seems to mainly generate
exemptions and special rules relating to working time.
With regards to working time, our recommendations pertaining to the review of existing
exemptions with the aim to promote universality, or near-universality, in ESA coverage are
premised, at a minimum, on bringing affected workers under the current working time regime.
Though this research brief does not present a comprehensive response to the Hours of Work
and Overtime Pay options posed in the Interim Report (5.3.1), we note many of these options
hold real potential to seriously degrade the quality of work in Ontario, particularly those that
involve a lengthening of the working day or working week, and those that undermine the right
to refuse excess and overtime hours. Many of the options related to Hours of Work and
Overtime Pay also have the potential to make the exemptions negotiated in the SIRs process
irrelevant, effectively extending these exemptions to all workers. Research has well established
the negative effects of long working hours on physical and mental health, as well as on
household divisions of labour.46 Moreover, loosening regulations around working time fosters
an inequitable distribution of work hours, promoting a polarization between those who work
part-time, and those who work full-time hours beyond the norm.47 Additional research on the
negative i pli atio s of o ki g ti e fle i ilit is discussed in Section 5.3.2, Scheduling,
below. With the exception of option 11 in Section 5.3.1, which suggests reducing the weekly
threshold for overtime pay from 44 hours to 40 hours, the proposed Hours of Work and
46
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Overtime Pay options proposed in the Interim Report will further erode the social minima set
by the ESA. For the purpose of evaluating exemptions and special rules in the areas of Hours of
Work and Overtime Pay, we therefore recommend the adoption of option 11 in Section 5.3.1 as
a new standard for the overtime threshold for all employees. Based on available evidence, we
cannot recommend adoption of any of the other working time options.
The Interim Report acknowledges the fact that the labour market is dynamic and continually
changing. Below, we recommend that all ES exemptions should be routinely reviewed every 10
years in order to assess whether the industrial conditions that prompted the creation of the
exemption still exist. Given that the exemptions stemming from the SIRs process are now a
decade old, we recommend their review using the new process described below, following the
review of the exemptions listed in Category 3.
Category 3: Exemptions that should be reviewed in a new process
For this category, the Special Advisors have requested feedback on three options that outline
the proper process to be implemented for the review and assessment of the current
exemptions, as well as any new exemptions proposed in the future. In what follows, option 2 is
recommended, and some additional suggestions for the process and evaluation criteria are
offered.
Option 1: Use the policy framework developed by the Ministry for the SIRs process described
above and use the criteria developed by the Ministry in the SIRs process to evaluate the
exemptions
As noted above, little public information is available about the SIRs process or its
implementation. In the absence of such information, we do not recommend this option.
Further, the core and supplementary conditions established by the SIRs would benefit from
further clarification and extension.
Option 2: Create a new statutory process to review exemptions with a view to making
recommendations to the Minister for maintaining, amending or eliminating exemptions/special
rules
As established by the Interim Report, there are currently roughly 60 groups of exemptions that
have been carried forward throughout the history of ES legislation in Ontario, and which have
not ever been reviewed for their appropriateness or continuing relevance. These might be
thought of as a a klog of e e ptio s e ui i g e ie , a d thus it is app op iate to esta lish
24

a statutory process to clear this backlog, and then to establish a system of regular review
moving forward.
The goal of the review process is to establish procedural and substantive fairness in relation to
labour regulations. We elaborate on the criterion of substantive fairness below, but here we
want to emphasize the importance of procedural fairness, which at a minimum requires an
unbiased decision-maker and that people affected by the decision be given an opportunity to
be heard. As a general matter, fair procedures are important because they improve the quality
of the decision-making by providing the decision-maker with a better factual predicate and
understanding of the concerns of those affected and by providing those affected with
confidence that the decision has taken their evidence and views into account.48 In the labour
and employment context, the importance of providing workers with a right to be heard is
fu the e ha ed the p i iple of oi e, hi h the “pe ial Ad iso s defi e as the ight to
participate in decision- aki g… e ause pa ti ipatio i de ision making is an end in itself for
atio al hu a ei gs i a de o ati so iet . 49
In order to clear the backlog of exemptions requiring review:






A review process would be initiated by the MOL, with strict timelines for each group of
occupations.
Exemptions and special rules would be addressed in sector- or industry-wide groups, to
avoid inconsistencies within an industrial group, as is currently the case.
A sector- or industry- specific tripartite committee would be established, with an equal
number of representatives from employers and employees, and a neutral arbitrator (as
Chair). The size of the committee would vary in relation to the size/complexity of the
exemptions being considered, and range from three to seven members, with a
preference for smaller committees. This committee would advise the Minister,
consistent with the current practice that regulations under the ESA are made by Cabinet
on the advice of the Ministry.
The statute establishing the review process would contain the criteria under which
exemptions and special rules would be evaluated. The statute should provide that there
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is a presumption in favour of universality – that all Ontario employees should be
covered by ES as a set of minimum conditions for employment in the province – a
sentiment expressed by the Special Ad iso s, ho ote that the u de of pe suasio
to maintain, extend or modify an exemption is high and ought to lie with those seeking
to ai tai the e e ptio . 50 The onus would be on those seeking to maintain the
exemption/special rule to justify its retention, by establishing that all of the criteria
listed in the section below are met.
The committee would be required to solicit feedback and information from affected
employers and employees, as well as the public and any other interested parties (e.g.,
consumer groups) via online or mailed submissions and/or in-person sessions. There
could be participation by unions in the sector, if any, and/or persons or groups
designated to represent employee interests. Representatives of affected or related
industries and interests could also be invited to participate.
The committee would have the flexibility to conduct surveys or votes among employees
and or employers, if appropriate;
The committee would seek and the MOL fund, if appropriate, any needed independent
expert advice as in the case of complex hours of work issues, as well as provide
administrative support.

The committee would aim to fashion unanimous recommendations for the revision of the
relevant statues. If the committee is unable to come to a unanimous decision, the Chair will
provide a report of majority and dissenting recommendations to the Minister, who will be the
final arbitrator. In all instances, the reports of the committee would be made public at the same
time they are submitted to the MOL. Exemptions/special rules that are retained in the
regulations (including those established in the SIRs process) will undergo a review process every
10 years, following the same procedures described above. Regular review and the use of
consistent criteria would ensure that ES exemptions and special rules keep pace with changing
working conditions, and do not revert back to the current patchwork of coverage.
Requests for new exemptions or special rules would undergo a similar process of review, with
the addition of one additional criterion for evaluation as described below.
Criteria for Retaining/Establishing Exemptions and Special Rules
Based o the ite ia de eloped as pa t of the “I‘s p o ess, as ell as the go e
e ts
international and social obligations, we recommend the following expanded list of criteria for
50
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evaluating ES exemptions and special rules. In order for an ES exemption or special rule to be
retained and/or created, all criteria would need to be met. This approach is consistent with the
“pe ial Ad iso s o
e t that the e ie p o ess e ill likel e o
e d ould use fi ed
criteria for evaluation of exemptions and one that will invite the participation of workers and
worker representatives as well as employers and other interested stakeholders. In any review
of e e ptio s, a o siste t poli f a e o k i fo i g su h e ie is esse tial. 51
1) The nature of work in an industry is such that it is impractical for a minimum standard to
apply. Applying the standard would preclude a particular type of work from being done at
all or would significantly alter its output; the work could not continue to exist in anything
lose to its p ese t fo . Natu e of the o k elates to the characteristics of the work
itself. It does not relate to the quantity or cost of work produced by a given number of
employees, as all employment standards affect work output and costs. Nor does it relate to
the nature of the employer and how they have organized work.
This criterion is based on Core Condition A established in the SIRs process. The definition of the
atu e of o k is fu the spe ified to ake it e pli it oth the ua tit a d ost of o k is ot
a rationale for exemption, since all ES entail costs. Given the emergence of new forms of
employers and employment over the past decade,52 and the likelihood that new forms of
employment will continue to emerge, the criterion also specifies that the nature of the
employer and their organization of work does not provide sufficient justification for ES
exemptions and special rules.
2) The o k u de o side atio is o side ed to e de e t o k, as defi ed
International Labour Organization.

the

3) The work provides a social, labour market or economic contribution that argues for its
continued existence in its present form, even in the absence of one or more minimum
standards applying to it.
These two criteria speak to establishing the quality and importance of the work that is being
exempted. In order to ensure that Canada meets its international commitments to establishing
51
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decent work, in pursuit of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and other global
efforts, Ontario should not provide exceptional treatment for work that does not meet these
minimum standards. Criteria 3 replicates the supplementary condition used in the SIRs process.
4) Employers in an industry do not directly or indirectly control the working conditions that are
ele a t to the e plo e t sta da d u de o side atio . E plo e s is to e i te p eted
broadly, referring to companies both up and down the contracting/sub-contracting chain
(i.e. parent and/or subsidiary companies and subcontractors).
This criterion is based on Core Condition B in the SIRs process. It is extended in order to specify
an intentionally broad conception of employers, in order to address growing fissuring in the
labour market, globally interconnected corporations, and practices of contracting out and subcontracting.53 In the context of the globalization of labour, this criterion also ensures that
Ontario workers will be protected from demands stemming from the labour laws of other
jurisdictions, via parent and/or subsidiary employers.
5) The employee group to whom the exemption or special rule would apply be readily
identifiable, to prevent confusion and misapplication of the exemption/special rule.
This criterion is based on the supplementary consideration established in the SIRs process. The
potential for misclassification threatens to reduce fairness in ES by making it possible for
employers to evade provisions of the ESA by misclassifying workers, and for employees to be
deprived of their rights as a result of being misclassified. The presence of substantial
misclassification in the labour force suggests that this is an important criterion.54
6) Both employees and employers in the industry agree that a special rule or exemption is
desirable.
This criterion is based on the supplementary consideration established in the SIRs process. It
acknowledges the power relationship inherent in the employer-employee relationship, and
establishes that both parties must agree that the suspension of a minimum acceptable standard
is desirable. This criterion also speaks to the importance of requiring open consultations as part
‘a li gs, Mi hael
Legislati e egulatio of glo al alue hai s to p ote t o ke s: A p eliminary
assess e t. The Economic and Labour Relations Review 26(4): 660-677; Vosko, Managing the Margins, chapter 3;
Weil, The Fissured Workplace.
54
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of the process of reviewing and/or establishing exemptions. As the Special Advisors put it, it is
esse tial that o ke ep ese tati es pa ti ipate full i this p o ess so that e plo ee
i te ests a e hea d a d take i to a ou t. 55
7) Based on the current composition of the labour force, the employees to whom the
exemption or special rule would apply are not historically disadvantaged or precariously
situated in the labour market. That is, ES exemptions and special rules should not
compound existing labour market disadvantage.
This criterion ensures that ES promote fairness and do not perpetuate discrimination. Currently,
ES exemptions and special rules disproportionately affect workers from historically
disadvantaged groups; for instance, young people, recent immigrants, Aboriginal people, and
people from low-income families are less likely to be fully covered by the ESA than other
employees.56 Further, ES exemptions and special rules appear to compound other forms of
labour force precariousness: temporary employees, part-time employees, low-wage
employees, and non-unionized employees are less likely to be fully covered by the ESA than
other employees.57 In the absence of complete time-series data, it is not possible to assess
whether or not ES exemptions and special rules are more likely to have been created for jobs
that are held by employees form historically disadvantaged groups, or whether the presence of
ES exemptions and special rules lead to jobs being perceived as less desirable, and thus filled by
workers who have difficulty securing other employment. Nonetheless, moving forward,
ensuring that ES exemptions and special rules do not compound labour market disadvantage
ould fulfil O tario’s o
it e t to o -discrimination and obligations under the human
rights code.
One additional criterion is recommended for establishing new exemptions and/or special rules:
8) The exemption and/or special rule should be consistent with those in an industrial group or
sector.
Since new exemptions or special rules could potentially be requested for a single occupational
group, they would also need to be evaluated to ensure consistency with the larger industrial
group or sector. The application of this criterion will help to avoid the inconsistencies that
currently exist between similar occupations, often employees working on the same project, at
the same location, with different levels of ES coverage. The application of this criterion also
Mit hell a d Mu a , Cha gi g Wo kpla es ‘e ie , p.
.
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reduces the potential for misclassification of workers in similar occupations for the purpose of
evading ES.
Option 3: Create a new statutory process where the OLRB would have the authority to extend
terms and conditions in a collective agreement to a sector
This option is not recommended for two reasons. First, collective agreements are bargained so
as to provide a greater benefit than the floor established by the ESA. Contracting out of ES
coverage via collective agreements is typically only done in exchange for gains in other areas. In
addition, collective agreements are specific to local working conditions, remuneration, and
labour market pressures. In order for the terms and conditions in a single collective agreement
to be extended fairly to a sector, the entirety of the agreement would need to be extended,
including compensation and benefit packages. This mode of extension might entail establishing
sector-wide standards above the minima specified in the ESA, which does not seem to be a
feasible means of establishing and reviewing exemptions. Further, and more practicably, the
OLRB has limited resources that already result in long timelines for review: in 2014-15 more
than half of OLRB applications took more than 100 days to dispose of.58 Extending OLRB
authority to adjudicate ES exemptions and special rules would potentially strain their resources
further.
Supplement: List of ESA Exemptions That Should be Reviewed Under a New Process (Category 3)
We note that the list of ESA exemptions for review has several omissions, and two confusing
entries.
The following groups with ES exemptions and special rules have been omitted from the list:
 Optometrists
 Homeworkers
 Homecare Employees Who Provide Homemaking or Personal Support Services
The list i ludes a e t
occupational group.

fo Ho e ake s #

, e e though these a e ot a e e pt

The list includes a duplicate entry for seasonal Canning, Processing, Packing or Distribution of
Fresh Fruit or Vegetables. This group should rightly be considered along with the agricultural
occupations, given the seasonal nature of much agricultural work.
O ta io La ou ‘elatio s Boa d .d. A ual ‘epo t
/
. O li e:
http://www.olrb.gov.on.ca/english/AnnualReports/OLRB-AnnualReport-2014-15.pdf
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5.3.2 Scheduling
Background:
The ESA has no provisions regarding scheduling. The Act does not require employers to provide
employees with advance notice of work hours, or to provide notice for changes to established
schedules. There is, however, a three-hour rule, which applies in cases where an employee
who regularly works more than three hours is required to report to work but then works less
than three hours. In such cases, the affected employee must be paid the higher of three hours
at the i i u
age, o the e plo ee s egula age fo the ti e o ked. In canvassing
potential reforms to the scheduling provisions of the ESA, the Interim Report sets out five
options.
Option 1: Maintain the status quo
The first option set out in the Interim Report is to maintain the status quo, which would mean
no employer requirements for advance notice or notice of scheduling changes, and no
employee rights to request scheduling changes. Yet research conducted through the Closing
the Enforcement Gap research partnership has found that many employees have schedules
that are either unpredictable or inflexible. A recent survey of Ontario employees found that
over 30% reported at least one scheduling problem in their job. 59 Scheduling problems were
even more pronounced among low-wage earners, with over 50% of those earning less than $15
an hour reporting a scheduling problem. The most common problems include not knowing the
schedule in advance and experiencing last minute scheduling changes.60 Another study of 400
employees in precarious jobs found that more than half did not know their schedule at least
o e eek i ad a e a d
% did t get u h o e tha a da s oti e half of the ti e. 61 For
these reasons, as well as those outlined below, we do not recommend option 1. It would leave
the ESA inadequate in an area of workplace regulation that requires significant attention.
Option 2: Expand or amend existing reporting pay rights in the ESA
Option 2 offers several possible changes to reporting pay rights, all of which involve an increase
to the current minimum hours of reporting pay (the three-hour rule ): (a) to three hours at
59
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regular pay; (b) to four hours at regular pay; or, (c) to the lesser of three or four hours at the
regular rate or the length of the cancelled shift. Providing a minimum of three hours of
compensation to employees when a shift is canceled is the norm among other provinces. An
exception is BC, where employees who are scheduled to work eight hours or less are
compensated for a minimum of two hours, and employees who are scheduled to work for more
than eight hours are paid for a minimum of four hours. In this jurisdiction, both of these criteria
apply even when the employee works less than two or four hours. In Ontario, the current policy
does not provide protection for employees who work less than three-hour shifts, or for
students, who are exempt from the three-hour rule. Employers can avoid paying the
reporting pay by scheduling split shifts that are less than three hours long. While there is no
specific data available on employees who work three hours or less in a shift, they are likely to
be part-time and/or non-permanent employees. Creating a three-hour minimum duration
requirement for shifts would improve the working conditions for employees, and ensure that all
e plo ees ould e eligi le fo the th ee-hou ule. More discussion of these exemptions
can be found in the discussion of Category 1 under Section 5.2.3 Exemptions, Special Rules, and
General Process of this brief.
Providing a fair compensation for employees who have their shift cancelled or shortened is
important as there are personal and financial costs associated with working that will still occur
regardless of the shortened work shift. For employees who have caregiving responsibilities,
they must find alternative caregivers while they are at work. Many will likely have to pay for
childcare services for the entire duration they would have been at work regardless of when
their shift ends. Additionally, the cost of transportation to work, as well as regional differences
in transportation costs, must also be considered. As transportation costs and commuting times
continue to increase, it is important that employees receive sufficient compensation for their
transportation to and from work. While this amount can be justified when the employee is
working a full shift, it can become a financial hardship if employees are not compensated fairly
for their shortened shift.
Option 2a: Increase minimum hours of reporting pay from current 3 hours at minimum wage to
3 hours at regular pay
Although this option marginally improves the current situation, it provides a) insufficient
financial compensation for employees who have their shifts shortened and b) less
compensation than option 2b.
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Option 2b: Increase minimum hours of reporting pay from 3 hours at minimum wage to 4 hours
at regular pay
This option represents marginal improvement, as it provides employees with more financial
compensation to recover the transportation costs and to potentially lessen the impact of paying
for childcare services that might not be needed if the shift is shortened. Employees require
more compensation for shorter shifts, as it is likely that many budget on the expected income
they will earn based on their scheduled hours. Financial hardships can occur when shifts are
shortened and the employee is not fairly compensated. Providing four hours at regular rate or,
more preferably, for the length of the cancelled shift if it is longer than four hours would
improve the situation for low-wage employees. Similarly, although this option improves the
current situation and would provide more financial compensation than option 2a, it still does
not provide sufficient compensation for employees who have their shifts shortened.
Option 2c: Increase minimum hours of reporting pay from 3 hours at minimum wage to lesser of
3 or 4 hours at regular rate or length of cancelled shift
Although this option represents a modest improvement over the current ESA provision, it
provides insufficient compensation for unexpected shorter shifts given the above evidence, and
is qualitatively inferior to option 2a, and thus is not recommended over option 2b.
Option 3: Provide employees with the job-protected right to request changes to schedules at
certain intervals
Option 3 suggests that the right to request scheduling changes could be provided at specified
intervals (e.g., twice per year) and that employers would be obligated to consider requests for
scheduling changes. This option arises from a concern that is shared by many employees;
namely, the need to exert some control over work hours.
Research on working time notes that tendencies for work-life conflict have grown markedly
over the past two decades, with many employees reporting increasing difficulties in balancing
work time with responsibilities outside work.62 In addition, research identifies the lack of
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control over work hours to be a major cause of work-related stress.63 Such stress can stem from
short notice for extra overtime, the uncertainty associated with not receiving sufficient notice
of a work schedule, or the inability to balance the responsibilities of work with obligations and
responsibilities outside the workplace due to inflexible scheduling practices. Finally, there are
gender-equity implications related to the scheduling of working time, as women remain
primarily responsible for reproductive labour.64 This can involve caring for family members at
times that may overlap with work hours, which can also be a factor contributing to workrelated stress.65 The ability to exert some control over work scheduling could provide some
means to accommodate the competing demands between work and home that are
experienced by many women employees.
Due to power imbalances in the workplace, many employees are in a position where they are
unable to exercise any control over their schedules. It must be noted that the right to request
scheduling changes as outlined in option 3 offers no guarantee that such requests would be
accepted, ensuring that employers retain the discretion to ignore such requests. Yet, providing
employees with a job-protected right to request scheduling changes would constitute a first,
small step towards addressing a major concern related to the scheduling of working time. For
these reasons, this option represents a largely symbolic, marginal improvement over the status
quo.
Option 4: Require all employers to provide advance notice in setting and changing work
schedules
Option 4 offers a number of possible strategies related to advance notice, specifically:
requiring employers to post schedules in advance within a specified time frame (e.g., two
weeks); requiring employers to pay employees more if a schedule is changed last-minute;
requiring that existing part-time employees be offered additional hours of work before new
employees are hired; requiring that part-time and full-time employees be given equal access

63

Jackson and Thomas, Work and Labour in Canada; Lewchuk, Wayne, Marlea Clarke, and Alice de Wolff (2011)
Working Without Commitments: The Health Effects of Precarious Employment. Kingston and Montreal: McGillQuee s U i e sit Press.
64
Armstrong, Pat and Hugh Armstrong (2010) The Double Ghetto: Canadian Women and Their Segregated Work.
3rd Edition. Toronto: Oxford University Press; Luxton, Meg and June Corman (2001) Getting By in Hard Times:
Gendered Labour at Home and On the Job. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
65
Marshall, Katherine (April,
The Fa il Wo k Week. Perspectives on Labour and Income. (Statistics
Canada Catalogue No. 75-001-X) pp. 5-13. Online: http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/75-001-x/2009104/pdf/10837eng.pdf

34

to scheduling and time-off requests; and requiring that employers secure employee consent in
order to add hours or shifts once a schedule has been posted.
Employer strategies of time flexibility have become commonplace over the past several
decades, particularly as employers seek to adjust the scheduling of working time in relation to
consumer demand, and also to adopt lean scheduling practices that have shrunk core fulltime workforces, prompted the growth of part-time work, and relied on short-notice overtime
hours as a means to respond to increased demand for products and services.66 For many
employees, time flexibility has contributed to a growing uncertainty with regards to work
schedules, as with no obligations for advance notice, employers often make scheduling
decisions on very short notice. For low-wage employees, scheduling uncertainty makes it very
difficult to hold a much-needed second job. These changing approaches to work time
scheduling have potentially negative implications for job quality, work-life balance, and the
provision of reproductive labour in the household.
In relation to working time change, establishing employer responsibilities to provide advance
notice has emerged as a central concern amongst many groups of employees, particularly
those in service economy jobs and amongst part-time employees where regular hours of work
are less the norm, and work schedules less predictable. Just as with lack of control over
working time, research has noted that a lack of certainty over work scheduling contributes to
both work-related stress and work-life conflict.67 This lack of certainty flows from both the
stress that a ises out of the i a ilit to pla ahead of ti e to add ess all of o e s o ligatio s
outside of work, as well as the inevitable conflicts that may arise between such obligations
and a variable and unpredictable work schedule.
The problems associated with scheduling uncertainty are captured in ongoing interviews with
employees conducted under the auspices of Closing the Enforcement Gap . For example, one
respondent stated:
You asi ally do ’t ha e a life, you a ’t s hedule a ythi g, you a ’t eet friends. You
a ’t go to do tor’s appoi t e ts … You are literally po erless he it o es to
scheduling.68
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In recent times, a range of strategies to address these concerns has arisen. In the grocery
store sector in Canada, unions that represent part-time grocery employees have recently
begun to negotiate collective agreement provisions that provide some scheduling certainty,
as well as guaranteed hours.69 The San Francisco Retail Workers Bill of Rights, which is
discussed in the Interim Report, is a widely noted example.70 The primary aims of these
strategies are to provide employees with some measure of predictability over work hours
and to also promote greater stability for part-time employees, who are most often affected
by flexible scheduling practices.
In order to address the very real and growing concerns about scheduling uncertainty, and to
keep pace with the emerging scheduling practices that aim to promote some measure of
predictability for employees, we recommend option 4. As outlined in the Interim Report,
pursuing this option should include (but not be limited to) the full range of conditions
specified.
Option 5: Allow for sectoral regulation of scheduling
Option 5 suggests that sectors be encouraged to develop their own scheduling arrangements.
Such arrangements would be based on overall policy guidelines for best practices developed
by a government-appointed advisory committee consisting of representatives of employers,
employees, scheduling and other experts (including academics and representatives from
community service agencies). Sectoral committees would also be struck to advise the Minister
of Labour on sector-specific scheduling committees. The Industrial Standards Act (ISA), which
was repealed in September 2001, allowed industries to have different wages and scheduling
hours and days.71 One of the weaknesses of the ISA was that it reinforced gendered divisions
of wages and working conditions, and women were often determined to be in the bottom of
the skill hierarchy.72 Going back to this structure could thereby reduce some of the
advancements made in this area after the A t’s repeal. Additionally, allowing for sectoral
regulation may create an inconsistent patchwork of rules that make it difficult to administer.
For example, Australia currently has 122 industries and occupations that have different
scheduling rules. For these reasons, we do not recommend option 5.
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5.3.4 Personal Emergency Leave
Background:
Since September 2001, the ESA has provided unpaid Personal Emergency Leave (PEL) not
exceeding 10 days each calendar year to employees who work in establishments that regularly
employ 50 or more people. Reasons for PEL can include personal illness, or the death, illness or
other emergencies concerning an immediate family member or other dependent relatives. The
legislative intent behind the PEL standard is to allow employees in firms employing 50 or more
people time off to deal with emergencies without penalty.73 The Interim Report sets out four
options for reforming the PEL provisions of the ESA, which we respond to below.
Option 1: Maintain the current exemption for workplaces with fewer than 50 employees
The first option set out in the Interim Report is to maintain the status quo, including the current
exemption for workplaces with fewer than 50 employees.
Research shows that maintaining the firm size exemption for PEL provisions will perpetuate
what is recognized as an arbitrary and poorly justified exclusion of employees from full
protection of the ESA.74 It is widely acknowledged that this exemption results in different
workplace standards for employees in firms of nearly identical sizes. If adopted, the option
would also perpetuate legislative inconsistencies, as the ESA s othe lea e p o isio s a e ot
restricted only to employees in larger firms.75 Additionally, the PEL firm-size threshold may
promote contracting out and the use of agency employees in order to avoid regularly
employing 50 or more employees since research shows that labour legislation that varies
depending on firm size can trigger threshold effects. Although detailed Canadian data are not
available, Gourio and Roys, for example, demonstrate how firm size-dependent labour
regulations in France have led to a larger-than-expected proportion of firms of a size just below
the legislative threshold.76
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Furthermore, as a study of exemptions and special rules commissioned for the Interim Report
usi g data f o “tatisti s Ca ada s La ou Fo e “u e de o st ates, the fi -size exemption
fo PEL e a e ates i e uities i O ta io s la ou a ket. The app o i atel
% of O ta io
77
employees who work in small firms (of fewer than 20 employees) are more likely to be
precariously employed – specifically, they are more likely to earn low wages and to belong to
low-income families, to lack control over the labour process, and to experience high levels of
uncertainty. Indeed, fully 44% of employees in small firms earn $15 per hour or less, and 26%
are members of an economic family with earnings in the bottom quintile. 78 Employees in small
firms are also less likely to be unionized. Whereas about 25% of Ontario employees not
employed in federally regulated industries are unionized, this is so for only about 5% of
employees in small firms.79 Compared to other Ontario employees subject to the ESA, a larger
percentage of employees in small firms are employed part-time (25%) or on a temporary basis
(17%).80 And young employees (ages 15-29) are also concentrated in small firms.81 In short, the
current exemption for PEL exacerbates labour market insecurity for employees already
experiencing social disadvantages and precariousness in employment. It is especially
detrimental to women in small firms, given the assumption (and statistical reality) that they are
responsible for the majority of unpaid care giving, and are therefore more likely to need to
access leaves. The PEL exemption is out of sync with growing recognition that demographic
shifts, including the dramatic rise in labour force participation among women, the increasing
number of single parent families, and population aging heighten the need for leave policies that
better enable employees to manage paid work and care giving.82
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The negative consequences of this option for the health and well-being of all employees,
employers and the broader public in Ontario should also be emphasized. The current
exemption means that many employees in smaller workplaces will continue to face heightened
pressure to work when they are sick or are confronting distressing situations affecting their
immediate family members outside the workplace (e.g., emergencies, illness, death, etc.). A
growing body of research on the problem of presenteeism, or working when ill or under
distress, demonstrates that its costs are potentially greater than those associated with
absenteeism.83 When employees who are sick go to work instead of rest, individual recovery is
delayed, productivity suffers, and co-e plo ees and the broader public health can be put at
risk.84 A meta-analysis of existing research on employees who work when they are sick
de o st ates that e plo ees de isio s to do so a e shaped
oth thei e plo e t a d
financial insecurity and the existence of strict workplace-based absence policies.85
Option 2: Remove the exemption for workplaces that employ fewer than 50 employees
The second option for PEL entails the removal of the exemption for workplaces that employ
fewer than 50 employees.
This is a relatively straightforward measure to implement that would contribute greatly to
employee well-being, serve the public good, and mitigate unprincipled inequities in the ESA s
scope of coverage. Implementing this option would also eliminate O ta io s a o alous status as
the only jurisdiction in Canada that allows for exemptions to leaves on the basis of workplace
size.86 For these reasons, and since cost-based arguments for exempting employees in small
firms from PEL are not justifiable given that all standards entail costs, we recommend option 2.
Option 3: Replace the general 10-day entitlement to PEL with a number of separate leave
categories (illness, bereavement, dependent illness/injury)
The Interim Report outlines a third option for reforming PEL that would involve replacing the
general 10-day entitlement with a number of separate leave categories (i.e. illness,
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bereavement, dependent illness/injury). Under this option, each leave category would entail a
set number of days not exceeding 10 in total.
This optio u s ou te to e plo ees g o i g eed fo fle i le lea e p o isio s di e ted
explicitly at enabling employees to manage paid work and unpaid care-giving responsibilities.87
Data f o “tatisti s Ca ada s La ou Fo e “u e i di ate that O ta io e plo ees easo s fo
personal-emergency absences have changed over the past thirty years; these changes are likely
to continue as a result of shifting demographics, social pressures and policy enactments.
Considering Ontario employees absences for personal emergency reasons, we see that own
illness/ disability accounts for a shrinking share of lost hours (from 84% in 1976 to 54% in 2015),
whereas personal/family responsibilities account for a growing share of lost hours (from 16% in
1976 to 46% in 2015). These changes suggest that the adoption of discrete leave categories
based on the current distribution of employee absences is likely to become rapidly outdated.
Further, there is a clear differentiation between how men and women use personal emergency
leave. In 2015, among men with absences for personal emergency reasons, only 26% of lost
hours were for personal/family responsibilities and 74% of lost hours were for own
illness/disability. Amongst the comparable group of women, 56% of lost hours were for
personal/family responsibilities and only 44% were for own illness/disability. Given the differing
needs of men and women, the imposition of separate leave categories is likely to exacerbate
gender inequalities in the labour force, whereas a more flexible and inclusive PEL entitlement
serves men and women equally well.
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Graph 1: Share of Hours Lost for Personal
Emergency Reasons: Men Only

Graph 2: Share of Hours Lost for Personal
Emergency Reasons: Women Only

Note: Ontario employees only; Labour Force Survey data from CANSIM Table 282-0213
Dispensing with the flexibility built into current PEL provisions in favour of more rigidly defined
and shorter leave sub-categories is thus not recommended on several grounds. Doing so would
disproportionately burden women employees who are more likely than men to be primary
a egi e s fo depe de ts. Cha gi g o kfo e de og aphi s, su h as o e s i easi g
participation in employment and the aging workforce, suggest that the reasons behind
e plo ees use of PEL ill o ti ue to ha ge i a s that a e diffi ult to p edi t, a d that
more rather than less flexibility in PEL provisions is required to accommodate these changes.
Option 3 also risks embroiling employees and employers in potentially contentious
disag ee e ts o e the e a t atu e of e plo ees e e ge ies fo the pu pose of
determining leave entitlements. These costs are more serious than the issue of some
employees who may lay claim to both employer-provided paid sick leave and the PEL
entitlements of the ESA. This concern could be easily resolved if employers bring their paid
leave policies into alignment with the scope of the ESA s PEL p o isio i.e. allo i g fo
da s
of paid personal emergency leave rather than sick leave only).
Option 4: Combining Options 2 & 3
A fourth option involves combining options 2 and 3. This option entails the consequences of
option 3.
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5.5.3 Creating a Culture of Compliance
Background:
The MOL in Ontario has long held the view that improved ESA compliance can be achieved
through education and self-help support resources.88 Over the last decade, the commitment to
this idea has been intensified through an expanded effort to provide employers and employees
with more accessible information and on-line tools which are aimed at helping employers to
exercise their responsibilities under the law and ensuring that employees know their rights
while being confident enough to contest when they are violated.89 Although the MOL has
traditionally characterized these efforts as educational, the Interim Report correctly recognizes
that compliance and education are not just about knowledge but are also about culture – that
is, whether the rule of ES law is valued by employers and employees in ways that lead to
compliance and quick correction of violations when they do occur without reprisals for
employees. In its discussion of the creation of compliance culture, the Interim Report
i t odu es the o ept of the i te al espo si ilit s ste
I‘“ hi h is o o ed f o the
Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) side of the MOL. The OHS division of the MOL has been
using the term since the 1970s to refer to a governance orientation in which the workplace
parties take joint responsibility for preventing hazards and resolving conflicts over health and
safety issues. The core elements of the IRS system are joint health and safety committees
comprised of employee and management health and safety representatives, the employee s
ight to efuse u safe o k a d the e plo ee s ight to i fo atio o o kpla es haza ds.
Government inspectors intervene in workplaces when the IRS system is not functioning
effectively. The Interim Report claims that the IRS has proven generally effective in
strengthening the health and safety culture than would otherwise be the case. They have raised
employee and employer awareness of health and safety issues and in many workplaces have
contributed to the identification and elimination of hazardous conditions and to a safer
o kpla e. 90
The Interim Report presents a number of options which involve an effort to reproduce the OHS
IRS in the employment standards domain. We discuss each option in turn.
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Options for an Internal Responsibility System in Employment Standards
Option 1a: Implement an ESA Committee, as an expansion of the existing Joint Health and
Safety Committee or,
Option 1b: Have other committees/representatives appointed in the workplace with jurisdiction
to deal with ESA compliance
The Interim Report recommends that under option 1a, the fundamental obligations of the
employer would be: to conduct a simplified self-audit developed and prescribed by the MOL, to
check that the employer is complying with the ESA; and to meet with the
co
ittee/ ep ese tati e a d e ie the e plo e s o plia e audit. A op of the
compliance and confirmation of the meeting with the committee/representative may be
required to be sent to the MOL.
Two possible models for the ESA Committee are also proposed as options:
A basic model where the requirement of the committee/representative would be to
eet ith the e plo e to e ei e a d e ie the e plo e s o plia e audit…if the
employee committee members/representative requested that the employer address
ESA issues or complaints, the employer would be obligated to do so, but the committee
would have no on-going duty to monitor compliance or to investigate any alleged
violations discovered by them or brought to their attention. 91
An enhanced model where in addition to the requirement to review with the
employer its compliance audit, the committee/representatives would have an on-going
responsibility to promote awareness of – and compliance with – the ESA.
Committees/representatives would be authorized under the Act to look into any ESA
matter identified by them, the employer or by any employee(s) and have the right to be
provided by the employer with all information necessary to establish whether there is
compliance with the ESA. The committees/representatives would have an on-going duty
to monitor compliance, to meet regularly with the employer, to communicate to
employees and to look into any alleged violations discovered by them or brought to
their attention. 92
We do not recommend any effort to duplicate the IRS in the ES domain, especially as a strategy
for addressing precarious forms of employment and vulnerable employees. While there is
91
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evidence that health and safety committees and employee representatives have positive
impacts in some workplaces,93 there is very little evidence of their effectiveness in the kinds of
precarious workplaces and industries where ES violations are more prominent. Indeed, the
evidence that is available, including the results of a recent MOL sponsored study of the OHS
IRS,94 suggests that small workplaces and certain industries which make a significant use of
contingent labour and vulnerable employee populations, are less likely to provide health and
safety training to employees, less likely to use health and safety services, and most importantly,
less likely to have health and safety committees, employee representatives, and regular health
and safety inspections as prescribed by law.95 Many studies suggest that non-unionized and
insecure employees are also less likely to report workplace injuries or seek changes in
hazardous work conditions or procedures whether to management or employee
representatives.96 A number of researchers have suggested not only that employee
representatives and joint committees in unionized workplaces are more effective in preventing
injuries97 but also that the effectiveness of unionized employee representatives has been
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declining for decades as union power has been eroded.98 For example, in a study of the mining
industry in Australia, Gunningham99 examines how the legislated introduction of individual
contracts and the industry use of contractors and sub- o t a to s oke the u io s apa it to
challenge hazardous conditions. Hall,100 Novek et al101 and Russell102 have documented similar
impacts of global competition and restructuring in the Canadian mining and meat-packing
industries on employee and union capacity to affect change in the workplace through
committees and employee representation. Furthermore, even within unionized contexts,
external enforcement is important in supporting and protecting the work of committees and
employee representatives.103 If these challenges are facing unionized employee representatives
and committees, where there is at least some protection against arbitrary dismissal, there is
little basis for arguing that employee representatives can effectively contest employment
conditions in contexts where employees have no meaningful protection.
Research also shows that the effectiveness of health and safety committees is often strongly
related to management attitudes and commitment to health and safety or, in other words, a
management safety culture.104 The problem is that there is no evidence showing that the
forced introduction of an IRS acts to create a management culture of cooperation and
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commitment. But there is evidence suggesting that costs, concerns about enforcement
penalties and other liabilities are key factors in encouraging employers to commit to health and
safety committees and safety more generally.105
Employee representatives in precarious employment contexts will suffer from the same
problems that employees in general have in these workplaces; they have little or no
employment security and the power to contest conditions that comes with security. They will
be subject to same complex of reprisal pressures and persuasion that most insecure employees
face, which means that the committees and the representation will be readily co-opted by
employers. Committees can then be exploited by the employer to rubber stamp audits which
will serve largely to conceal rather than reveal violations.106 Employees will consequently not
trust these representatives or the committees and, as such, will be no more likely to report
violations than they would to the MOL. A major enhancement of reprisal protections for
employee representatives along the lines outlined for reprisals in general would likely help. But
the fact remains that employee representatives would still be subject to substantial pressures
and/or inducements to accept and conceal violations.
Additionally, while it is arguable that cultural change can be crucial to the rule of law in
employment contexts, the focus on a cultural solution obscures the political and economic
factors shaping the cultural orientations and commitments of employers in many high-risk
industries. In contexts of ever-increasing competition and limited state regulation and
enforcement, employment violations are increasingly construed as a necessary part of business
strategy, whether in terms of growth or simply survival.107 And while there may be some
financial incentive in allaying employee compensation costs for employers to embrace
prevention through the IRS, there is no such incentive in the case of the ESA. Establishing a joint
committee of powerless employees is not going to change these dynamics. If one of the guiding
p i iples of this e ie is the e og itio of the i he e t po e i ala e a d i e ualit of
a gai i g po e et ee e plo e a d e plo ee …, 108 an IRS, as conceptualized, does not
address or provide non-unionized employees with any protection from this power imbalance
and reprisals. While it is worth remembering that one of the central criticisms of the OHS IRS is
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that the committees are only advisory, and hence the “pe ial Ad iso s proposal would
replicate this problem, ultimately the core problem is that insecure employee representatives
are not in a political position to make much of a difference even if the committees had real
powers. In this context, we have to ask what the value of a self-audit report is to employees
who have no power to do anything about ESA violations.
This said, requiring employers to conduct annual self-audits on compliance with the ESA is a
sensible proposal. Such an audit should, however, address all standards as a clear indication of
the MOL s commitment to the law as a whole rather than just selected aspects. The MOL could
provide self-audit tools for employers and the employer should be required to provide the
results of such audits to all employees. To provide employees with a real option of taking
action, a robust model of anonymous and third party complaints (discussed in S. 5.5.4) and
effective anti-reprisals and protection against unjust dismissal nevertheless remains essential.

5.5.4 Reducing Barriers to Making Claims
5.5.4.1 Initiating the Claim
Background:
ESA enforcement relies substantially on individual employees filing complaints regarding
violations of their rights with the MOL. This centrality of complaints means that only a small
fraction of violations will ever be redressed formally through the MOL s enforcement system
since the vast majority of employees who experience a workplace violation do not complain.
Reporting on the U.S. case, for example, researchers conservatively estimate that for every 130
violations of the FLSA’s overtime provisions, only one complaint is received by the WHD.109 The
decision of employees to file a complaint hinges on their perceptions of the efficacy of the
complaint process, the assistance available to them throughout the complaint process, and the
risk of employer retaliation. This risk may be amplified for employees with temporary or
otherwise tenuous citizenship/residency status.110 Many employees may also not perceive the
violations that they experience to be a problem that could be solved, especially when such
violations are normalized in the workplace and/or when they do not possess or cannot acquire
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the documentary evidence normally required to validate their complaint.111 Additionally,
employees may not understand the different legislative frameworks governing the workplace
(ES, OHS, human rights) and which one is relevant in a particular situation.112
Exacerbating barriers to the complaints system, amendments to the ESA in 2010 also
introduced the requirement that employees must first attempt to resolve the issue with the
employer before filing a complaint. While there are some exceptions to this rule, the provision
establishes the broader principle that employees can and should seek resolution prior to
involving the MOL and assumes that there are no possible employment implications except for
those employees, such as young employees, who are exempt via the policy exceptions.
Employees are currently unable to file anonymous complaints and third parties are also not
allowed to file anonymous complaints on behalf of employees.
In addressing the issue of complaint making, the Interim Report sets out five options.
Option 1: Maintain the status quo with a general requirement to first raise the issue with
employers but at the same time maintain the existing policy exceptions and maintain current
approach of accepting anonymous information that is assessed and potentially triggers a
proactive inspection
Gi e that the MOL s o plai ts s ste appea s to e e o i g less a essi le to O ta io
employees, we do not recommend option 1. Between 2008/09 and 2012/13, the number of ES
complaints submitted annually dropped substantially, but leveled off starting in 2012/13.113
Notably, the absolute number of non-unionized Ontario employees increased during that time
period; thus, whereas in 2008/09, there was one complaint submitted for every 173 nonunionized employees in Ontario, in 2014/15, there was one complaint submitted for every 285
non-unionized employees (see graph below).114 Given the persistence of precarious
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employment over the past decade in Ontario,115 it is highly unlikely that the reduction in
complaints received reflects lower rates of employer non-compliance. A more likely explanation
is that the requirement for employees to attempt to resolve their complaint with their
employers prior to approaching the MOL, introduced under the Open for Business Act (OBA),
has served to further discourage employees from coming forward.
Graph 3: ES Complaints Submitted to the Ministry of Labour,
Relative to the Number of Non-Unionized Employees in Ontario,
2008/09 to 2014/15116

Despite the exemptions to the self-help requirement for certain categories of complainants,
there is evidence that the requirement is now an entrenched feature of the complaints system.
Between 2011/12 and 2014/15, more than 4 out of 5 complainants reported that they had
either contacted or attempted to contact their employer.117 The most commonly cited reason
complainants give for not contacting their employer is fear.118 Research shows that this fear is
particularly pronounced amongst complainants who are still working for their employer at the
time that they file a complaint.119
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The requirement that an employee first directly confront their employer may deter an
employee from initiating a complaint concerning monetary violations. In the context of what is
often an already precarious employment relationship characterized by unequal power
relations, it provides opportunity for an employer to pressure an employee not to go forward to
the MOL by mobilizing multiple forms of power. Reprisal, which can entail receiving undesirable
assignments and schedules, being subject to harassment from management or co-employees,
or being terminated, has been a longstanding factor in discouraging employees from initiating
ES complaints with the MOL.120 A number of measures that would mitigate the risk of filing a
complaint are missing in Ontario. Ontario does not allow third party complaints. Nor does it
provide fulsome supports to employees in social locations where the risks associated with
making a complaint are particularly high, such as employees holding temporary or insecure
residency statuses. For example, employees in the Temporary Foreign Worker Program or the
Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program are tied to a single employer, and can face non-renewal
of their employment or potentially deportation if they seek to access the ES complaints
system.121 Many have financial obligations to households abroad, and cannot risk debarment
from future employment. If complaints to the government during employment are restricted by
these factors, any measure which requires employees to further expose themselves to these
risks without state involvement constitutes a potentially important barrier to filing a complaint.
Another element of the requirement that employees raise issues first with their employer is the
assumption that employees have the capacity to accurately identify ESA violations and, in
particular, calculate the amounts of money that may be owed to them. While the MOL has
provided more information to employees along with online self-help tools and translated
materials, the complexity of the law and its various exclusions and conditions are an
acknowledged problem as indicated in the Interim Report and papers commissioned for the
review.122 Moreover, some employees not currently recognized in the policy exclusions may not
have the numeracy or literacy skills necessary to fully identify and understand the violations of
their rights, and the computer skills or resource to find the necessary information. Education,
language and basic communication skills are all potentially significant barriers to being able to
express concerns to employers and, indeed, to determine whether and to what extent their
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rights are being violated.123 There is also the problem of identifying the employer which
research suggests is often not straightforward in a labour market context involving temporary
help agencies and complex supply chains of contractors and sub-contractors.124
One additional questionable assumption underlying the self-help provision is important to
recognize. When the government introduced the OBA in 2010, the logic of the new
requirement for employees to talk to their employer first was that the assumption that too
many employees were going to the MOL when the issues could have been easily resolved
internally. Along with neglecting the risk of reprisals to employees, there is considerable
evidence that if employees feel comfortable in raising a concern with an employer, that is in
particular, if there is trust in the employer-employee relationship, employees tend to first raise
concerns with managers and supervisors, in part because the trust means that they are not
concerned about a possible reprisal125 but also partly because they do not want to undermine
the relationship of trust that they have.126 Loyalty and commitment are also two factors that
often play a role in whether employees complain and to whom.127 The key issue then in terms
of encouraging reporting to employers is whether employees have the trust and respect in
management to raise the issues. As such, the employees who would go to their employer on
their own will do so regardless of any requirement because there is trust. However, for all those
employees who do not trust their employer, and in particular, those who feel insecure in their
employment relationship,128 an MOL requirement to go to the employer simply means that
they will not bring a complaint forward.129 In other words, employees who feel they can
complain to their employer without risk will complain and those who do not will not. As a policy
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tool, the requirement is thus seemingly having the effect of increasing barriers to reporting
rather than encouraging internal resolution, for the latter group, in particular.
Option 2: Remove the ESA provision allowing the Director to require that an employee must first
contact the employer before being permitted to make a complaint to the Ministry
For the reasons outlined above under option 1, this is a necessary measure to improve
e plo ee a ess to the o plai ts s ste , which we recommend adopting. It communicates
to all employees that they have the right to report violations to the Ministry of Labour and can
rely on it to accurately identify the violations and the monies owed and to protect their right to
file complaints on these matters. Removing this provision would also clearly signal that the
government is concerned about the challenges facing employees in precarious employment
while recognizing that power is a central dynamic constraining the capacity of all employees to
approach their employer with complaints.130
Option 3: Allow anonymous claims, it being understood that the facts of the alleged violation
must be disclosed to the employer by an ESO in order to permit an informed response
We recommend adopting this option. Anonymous complaints are helpful in encouraging
reporting and preventing reprisals and, as such, our research supports this option. Anonymous
complaints provide the most protection for employees who are still on the job they are
complaining about. Such complaints are available in Canada. The Government of Saskatchewan
allo s the e plo ee o a thi d pa t su h as a pa e t, f ie d o a e e of the o
u it
to submit a written complaint agai st a e plo e . The P o i e s Co plia e a d ‘e ie U it
then investigates these complaints.131 The anonymous complaint option is available if the
individual is still employed at the workplace, belie es that p o isio s of the p o i e s Labour
Standards Act are not being followed, and wants to seek redress but is not in a position to file a
formal complaint.132 Only written complaints with supporting evidence are reviewed. Adoption
of a similar procedure in Ontario would allow the MOL to conceal the identity of the employee
who originally made a complaint by pursuing orders for multiple employees if violations
involving other employees are found. The complainant would still have her or his complaint
addressed while the employer would be less likely to discern which employee(s) filed the
original complaint. In cases where no other violations are found in the inspection, the
Vosko et al, Challe gi g Ne Go e a e.
See the Saskatchewan Ministry of Labour Relations and Workplace Safety, Labour Standards
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complainant(s) could then be informed that the completion of the complaint will require that
the facts of their particular case will need to be revealed to the employer and the complainant
could then have the option of withdrawing the complaint. This approach would also help to
develop more robust enforcement machinery, which strategically uses the complaints process
to identify and correct multiple violations. Research suggests that while some violations may be
isolated to a single worker, most violations are being repeated across the firm and involve
multiple employees, especially in certain industry sectors.133
Option 4: Do not allow anonymous complaints, but protect confidentiality of the complainant, it
being understood that the facts of the alleged violation must be disclosed to the employer by an
ESO in order to permit an informed response
While this option is preferable to the status quo,134 particularly the current practice of requiring
employee self-resolution with the employer, it represents a weak alternative to anonymity.
While co fide tialit a alla so e e plo ees o e s, and should be assured within the
parameters that disclosure requires, without anonymity, employees will likely still be reluctant
to report. Therefore, we do not recommend option 4.
Option 5: Allow third parties to file claims on behalf of an employee or group of employees, it
being understood that the facts of the alleged violation must be disclosed to the employer by an
ESO in order to permit an informed response
Third party complaints that also preserve anonymity have a number of significant advantages—
we therefore recommend this option in conjunction with option 3. First, third party
organizations, such as worker centres or unions, may have a better understanding of the
e plo ees situatio gi e o
o a kg ou d, k o ledge a d e pe ie es hi h a e
important in building enough trust to overcome barriers of suspicion and fear.135 Second, third
party organization have also built up their own expertise and knowledge of the law while
developing connections with the government inspectorate which gives them insights into the
complaints-making and investigation process which can be of considerable assistance to
Be ha dt, A ette et al
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employees making complaints. Third, these organizations can also offer employees a collective
mechanism through which they can get together and file complaints.136 The existence of this
type of mechanism could help employees overcome the isolation and fear they often
experience, especially those engaged in temporary forms of employment. Multiple complaints
through a third party organization can also better protect the anonymity of the employees
involved. Although much of the research supporting these points has been focused on the use
of third party organizations in the U.S. and Australia to assist with extending the capacity to
conduct inspections,137 Weil and Pyles138 point out that, overall, the use of third party collective
workplace agents helps to reduce the risk to individual employees and lowers the cost of
gathering and disseminating the information and knowledge necessary to identify and respond
to violations.
Although we support the option of allowing third party complaints on behalf of employees, we
emphasize the importance of continued state involvement in the complaints investigation and
enforcement process. Even with third party complaints, employees who are fearful of reprisals
will still have such concerns, especially if the third party advocates and the employees
themselves do not have robust state protection to prevent reprisals. Organizations advocating
for employees in employment situations thus need to have the same authority as those
representing employers which mea s the elatio s ust e fo alized, sustai ed a d
igo ous. 139 Research on existing third-party engagement initiatives raise some concerns about
the effectiveness of third-parties and their ability to respond to worker concerns given the
limited organizatio al apa it of e plo ees o ga izatio s.140 For example, a review of the
evidence on a British system of Citizen Advisory Bureaux (CAB) which offers employment advice
and assistance through largely volunteer organization notes:
surveys of employees who accessed CAB services have found dissatisfaction due to
delays in obtaining advice, poor communication of case information from advisors,
Weil, Da id a d A a da P les
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a d a la k of o ti uit et ee ad iso s…Mo eo e , su e s of e plo e t
advisors within the CAB themselves document concern about insufficient numbers
of e plo e t spe ialists….141
This finding points to the limitations of a passive system of third party advice, where advisers
simply assist employees with the complaints process, and suggests that the involvement of
third party advocates for employees should be viewed as a supplement to, not a replacement
of, robust MOL enforcement of the law through both complaints investigation and proactive
inspections.

5.5.4.2 Reprisals
Background:
The ESA prohibits employers from intimidating, dismissing or penalizing employees who
attempt to exercise their rights therein. The o us of p oof that a e plo e s a tio as ot a
reprisal is on the employer, and if an ESO finds that a reprisal has taken place, the MOL can
order compensation and reinstatement. Yet, as a growing body of literature on ES enforcement
demonstrates, reprisal provisions on the books often fail to protect employees who are still
employed with the employer against whom the complaint has been made. The literature on
employment violations points consistently to reprisals as a core problem underlying the
effectiveness of complaints-based systems of enforcement. There is, moreover, ample evidence
that the current system in Ontario is not providing sufficient protection and reassurance for
employees.142 This problem only intensifies as rates of unionization decline, since collective
agreements have long served as a buffer against such action, and as labour market insecurity
intensifies, leaving greater proportions of the employed population more vulnerable to
arbitrary and sudden dismissal.143 Employee vulnerability to reprisal thus serves as a major
impediment to the exercise of employee voice, and undermines any regulatory arrangement
premised on such voice. The Interim Report presents a number of options for reforming the
ESA s a ti-reprisal provision.
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Option 1: Maintain the status quo
We do not recommend this option in light of growing awareness of the problem of reprisals.
Evidence suggests that fear of reprisals remains a significant deterrent to employees accessing
the MOL s E“ o plai ts s ste . Only a small minority of employees attempt to access the
legislative protections of ES while still employed in the job they are complaining about.
Consistently fewer than 10% of complaints in each fiscal year from 2007/08 to 2014/15 come
from employees who are working for the employer they are filing a complaint against.144 The
extremely low proportion of employees who file complaints against their employers while still
on the job has remained relatively constant across time. The Auditor General of Ontario
reported a similarly low level of complaints from employees on the job over a decade ago.145
There is also evidence to suggest that reprisals are being claimed more often than before.
Whereas in 2007/08, reprisal claims were included in 6% of all complaints, the proportion of
complaints that have a reprisal claim have grown steadily each year, increasing to 9% in
2010/11 and 10% in 2014/15.146 Put differently, the share of complaints that include a claim of
reprisal almost doubled between 2007/08 and 2014/15. Reprisal claims are also more common
among complainants still working for their employer at the time that they make a complaint.
For instance, in 2012/13, more than one in five complainants who were still working for their
employer included a reprisal claim as part of their complaint. Most notably, the proportion of
complaints that include a reprisal claim appears to be rising the fastest among this group of
employees147 (see graph below). This increase in reprisal claims is not surprising given the new
opportunities for retaliatory behaviour flowing from the 2010 requirement, under the OBA,
that employees must disclose the nature of their grievance to their employer as a condition of
filing a complaint. The recent growth in reprisal claims is all the more troublesome for the MOL
given that such claims are very often difficult and time consuming for ESOs to investigate,
especially when the reprisal is subtle or not well-documented.
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Graph 4: Share of Complaints that Include Reprisal Claims,
by Complainant's Work Status, 2007/08-2012/13148

20.0%
15.0%
10.0%
5.0%
0.0%
2007-08
Still working

2008-09

2009-10

Fired or laid off

2010-11
Quit

2011-12

2012-13

All complaints

Currently, the Ministry does not expedite investigating reprisals, as reflected in the average six
months that it takes for an ESO reprisal assignment and investigation to be completed.149 This
time lapse means that employees, many of whom have limited financial resources, are forced
to deal with the economic and other consequences of reprisals independently for an extended
period of time. In this context, even if the Ministry finds that there was a reprisal, the damage is
done to the individual, contributing, potentially, to the spreading of fear among employees. 150
Monetary penalties for reprisal remain low in Ontario. While reinstatement and compensation
for lost wages can be seen as costs by employers, these are relatively minimal costs for actions
that have profound consequences both for individual employees and the rule of law in the
employment context. Considering all entitlements related to reprisal claims, between 2008/09
and 2014/15, the median entitlement cost to the employer was less than $3,000.151 Moreover,
only a fraction of reprisal claims filed by employees were validated. Even though there is an
onus on employers to disprove reprisals, employees still have to prove their case, a
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requirement often necessitating extensive documentary evidence and quite complicated legal
arguments.
One specific reprisal problem in Ontario concerns those employees in the Seasonal Agricultural
Workers Program, and other temporary foreign worker programs, who face additional barriers
to making a complaint. Research on employees in these situations indicates substantial fear of
reprisals.152 In this context, employers should be prohibited from forcing deportation of an
employee who has filed an ESA complaint. In addition, the Ministry should work with the
federal government to ensure that migrant employees who have filed complaints are granted
open work permits so that they may continue to work while their complaint is investigated.
Maintaining the status quo will position the province of Ontario further behind other
jurisdictions with stronger anti-reprisal protections for employees. For example, in recognition
of the likelihood of employer retaliation, the U.S. WHD does not disclose the identity of the
complainant when conducting an investigation based on an employee complaint. The State of
Califo ia s a ti-retaliation measures are also noteworthy for the protection they offer
employees with insecure residency status. Recently passed laws prevent an employer from
th eate i g to epo t a e plo ee s i
ig atio status, o e gagi g in immigration related
a ts su h as e uesti g fu the p oof of a e plo ee s autho izatio to o k e o d that
required by federal law), or contacting immigration authorities to report an employee
suspected of being undocumented. If an employer takes these actions within 90 days of an
employee filing a complaint, employees can seek damages and the employer faces the potential
suspension or revocation of their business license.153
Along with increasing the probability of enforcement rulings against employers, the corporate
crime literature points to the importance of significant penalties for employers as critical to
effective deterrence.154 Tougher enforcement, either through the adoption of a policy of
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pursuing Part 3 prosecutions for reprisals, levying significant fines or even imprisonment or, a
consideration of tougher new penalties such as the suspension of business licenses, would
clearly and unambiguously indicate that reprisals are not legally or culturally acceptable. Public
pronouncements ensuring that these actions are widely known is also essential to this
approach, while also adding to deterrence through both embarrassing and augmenting
employer fear of business client reactions.155
Option 2: Require ESOs to investigate and decide reprisal claims expeditiously where there has
been a termination of employment (and other urgent cases such as those involving an alleged
failure to reinstate an employee after a leave)
Option 2 would require that ESOs quickly investigate and decide on reprisal claims involving
termination. An expedited process on all reprisal claims is crucial both from a fairness and
justice perspective and in terms of encouraging employees to come forward with their
complaints. Research demonstrates that the fear of reprisal is often based on personal
experiences and the stories that employees tell other employees about their experiences or the
experiences of others who have faced reprisals.156 If the narratives can be shifted so that
employees can begin telling stories of more positive outcomes, the impact of reprisal fears on
complaints-making may be significantly reduced. To minimize the costs to employees, this
process should provide interim reinstatement, if requested by the employee, pending a ruling
on cases of dismissal due to reprisals. This point is supported by research on injury reporting
which shows that the fear of job loss due to reporting is rooted not only in the loss of the job
but also the immediate economic and housing implications as many employees and their
families have very limited financial resources.157
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If reprisal claims involving termination are to be given priority, such priority should not occur at
the expense of other complaints.
Option 3: Require the OLRB to hear applications for review of decisions in reprisal on an
expedited basis if the employee seeks reinstatement
Option 3 is related to option 2. Accordingly, we recommend an expedited process at the OLRB
given the research-based rationale outlined above in response to option 2.

5.5.5 Strategic Enforcement
Background:
After acknowledging, based on public consultations as well as discussions with Ministerial staff
a d o
issio ed studies, that the e is a se ious p o le
ith e fo e e t of E“A
p o isio s, esulti g i too a people i too a
o kpla es ho do ot receive their
asi ights, the I te i ‘epo t highlights the i po ta e of st ategi e fo e e t. The
Special Advisors underscore that in a context of growing complexity in workplaces,
governments with limited resources face considerable challenges and therefore canvass a
variety of strategies for enforcing the Act. These strategies relate principally to the balance
between reactive enforcement in response to complaints and proactive enforcement, targeting
particular industries, geographic regions etc. where the failure to comply with provisions of the
ESA is well-known. Historically, the overwhelming share of enforcement resources has gone
towards supporting a reactive complaints-based system, where even expanded investigations
that emanate from a single verified complaint, have been rarely utilized.158
In addressing the issue of enforcement of ESA provisions, the Interim Report sets out seven
options.
Option 1: Maintain the status quo
As the Interim Report demonstrates, inspections can be of two general sorts – those followingup on complaints (i.e. reactive investigations) and those that target problem industries,
geographic regions etc. (i.e. proactive). Traditionally, however, the overwhelming share of
enforcement resources has gone towards supporting a reactive complaints-based system.
158
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Existing evidence does not support maintaining the status quo since only a small minority of
violations result in complaints to the Ministry. Indeed, the scholarly literature clearly
establishes that complaints do not accurately reflect the number or source of violations.159
Rather, proactive inspections, which reports published by the Office of the Provincial Auditor
General in both 1991 and 2004 indicate were severely under-utilized,160 are critical to any
enforcement scheme due to their effectiveness in detecting ESA violations.
While the number of proactive inspections has increased over the past decade, it remains the
case that only a tiny fraction of employers will ever be subject to inspection. The low probability
of p oa ti e i spe tio likel fa to s i to e plo e s judge e ts over whether or not to comply
with the ESA.
In recent years, between 2011/12 and 2014/15 specifically, the number of proactive
inspections conducted by the Ministry of Labour has increased. This is a positive development
because such inspections are effective in finding otherwise hidden violations, evidenced by the
fact that such inspections tend to result in high rates of discovered violations. Broadly, the
percentage of inspections that detected violations ranged from 75% to 77% in the years
between 2011/12 and 2013/14, but dropped to 65% in 2014/15.161 Of the different types of
inspections carried out, expanded investigations turn up the most violations; 82% of such
investigations revealed violations between the years 2011/12 to 2014/15. For targeted and
regular inspections, the rate across these years is 72% and 70% respectively.162 Such high rates
of violations indicate that greater investment in increasing proactively oriented inspections is a
good use of limited resources.
The importance of inspections also extends beyond uncovering violations. Inspections have a
substantial deterrent effect, especially among businesses in the same region and industry of the
inspected workplace. Furthermore, the deterrence effect is more pronounced for proactive
inspections than it is for investigations triggered by a single complaint.163 As Weil shows,
e plo e s a e se siti e to p oa ti e i spe tio s e ause the ep ese t a olt f o the
lue, 164 news of which is conveyed through employer and employee networks, thereby
encouraging greater compliance with minimum standards.
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Mo e ge e all , to adopt the status uo is to est o o e s lau els hile o kpla e p a ti es
continue to evolve in ways that evade regulation. Inspectorates in other jurisdictions continue
to experiment and enhance their proactive approaches. For example, as part of the model of
Strategic Enforcement 2.0, the WHD is striving to bring down the number of proactive
inspections that result in no violations being detected, and is achieving considerable success.
Traditionally, it has been the case in the United States, and remains the case in Ontario, that
complaint-initiated investigations are more likely to turn up violations than targeted
inspections. Improvements in the effectiveness of the WHD s p oa ti e i spe tio s mean that
these inspections are approaching complaint-based investigations in terms of rate at which
they detect non-compliance.165
Rather than maintaining the status quo, therefore, the overall orientation of the MOL should
reflect continual innovation and improvement, characterized by ongoing assessment of which
measures work best and which measures are less effective in light of evolving workplace
practices – at the present time, this strategy necessitates embracing more fully proactive
enforcement measures.
Optio : Fo us i spe tio s i orkpla es here
include that issue as part of the inspection

is lassifi atio

issues are prese t, a d

Despite the prevalence of misclassification, prevailing approaches to conducting inspections do
not focus on identifying instances of employee misclassification. Making such misclassification a
focus of inspections would therefore be a positive development, which we recommend.
However, doing so presents challenges since the ESA contains no provisions on employee
misclassification, and there is no administrative data providing information about workplaces
and industries where such misclassification is likely to be found. For this reason, as
recommended in our response to options posed under 5.2.1 Misclassification of Employees, it
may be necessary to establish a provision that makes misclassification a violation, subject to
stringent penalties, under the ESA. Eventually, such a provision would also generate data that
would point to common patters of misclassification.
It is also necessary to address the multiple forms of employee misclassification used by
employers to evade the application of the ESA. Addressing this issue means looking not only for
situations where employees are classified as independent contractors, but also situations
where employees are misclassified as managers for the purpose of limiting overtime pay and
Weil, Da id
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working time provisions of the ESA (a form of misclassification we address in our responses to
options posed under Section 5.2.3 Exemptions, Special Rules, and General Process).166 The
problem of managerial misclassification has been established by previous research. Two
surveys of nursing homes in the United States conducted by its Department of Labour in the
late 1990s established a compliance level of 70% in 1997 and 40% in 1999, with overtime
violations stemming from misapplied managerial and professional exemptions cited as key
factors in such low compliance rates.167 Inspectors should take account of other possible ways
employees may be being misclassified as certain types of employees for the purpose of limiting
the ESA (for example employees involved in the maintenance of structures being classified as
employees involved in construction so that a number of ESA provisions on working time no
longer apply).
While research supports efforts to address the problem of misclassification through
inspections, it by no means supports making misclassification a singular focus of investigations.
Rather, misclassification should be approached as one among many different employer
practices aimed at the evasion or violation of the ESA.
Option 3: Increase inspections in workplaces where migrant and other vulnerable and
precarious workers are employed
There is now a large literature that details the barriers that migrant employees and other
vulnerable employees in precarious jobs face in exercising voice when faced with violations.168
Many such employees face heightened threat of retaliation if they come forward, especially
those with an insecure residency status, thereby reducing their likelihood to do so. Increased
proactive inspections of workplaces where such employees are concentrated is recommended.
Option 4: Cease giving advance notice of targeted blitz inspections
Providing advanced notice to an employer for any inspection is not mandated in the ESA. It is
reasonable to assume that advance notice provides a given employer a chance to hide evidence
of violations, and to select which employees will be present and available for an ESO to speak
Le i e, Da id a d Da id Le i
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with on the day of an inspection. This opportunity may thereby reduce the number of violations
identified during an inspection, or increase the number of investigations that result in findings
of no investigation. This practice therefore likely represents a sub-optimal use of enforcement
resources. Partly for this reason, advanced warnings are not the policy of the WHD. We
recommend that the MOL also cease providing them.
In the case of targeted inspections or blitzes, the practice of issuing a public announcement
should however continue. Given evidence of the importance of employer and employee
networks in communicating the potential of inspections,169 public notices of industry blitzes
may motivate employers in a sector to bring themselves into compliance, maximizing the
benefit of the blitz.
Option 5: Adopt systems that prioritize complaints and investigate accordingly
We do not recommend this option. The ESA, since its inception, has sought to establish a set of
social minima aimed at achieving decency at work as well as universality and fairness.
Therefore, any reform to the complaint system must be oriented toward reducing the barriers
complainants face in voicing workplace violations regardless of the nature and degree of their
grievances. Cost savings to the MOL should not be achieved by limiting the access of employees
to the complaints system. Unlike in the United States, where the federal DOL can rely on state
governments to address individual complaints, there is no such fall-back in Ontario.170
Moreover, there are serious concerns, which are addressed below, about leaving individuals
who have experienced violations to seek remedies in the civil justice system or directly with the
OLRB.
The adoption of a system that prioritizes some complaints for investigation, particularly those
of a significant monetary magnitude, while streaming others away from the complaints intake
process into institutions such as the small claims court, is not consistent with maximizing
accessibility and employee voice. Research shows that only a small percentage of complaints
reach the system already. As mentioned previously, in the United States, it has been estimated
that for every one complaint lodged, there are about 130 ES violations, and this ratio fluctuates
across industries.171 An arrangement prioritizing complaints on the basis of the amount of the
monetary claim owed would result in further limits on the complaints that are investigated.

Weil, I p o i g Wo kpla e Co ditio s th ough “t ategi E fo e e t.
Vosko et al., E plo e t “ta da ds E fo e e t: A “ a of E plo e t “ta da ds Co plai ts, p.
171
Weil, I p o i g Wo kpla e Co ditio s th ough “t ategi E fo e e t, p. 83.

169
170

.

64

Should criteria for triaging complaints in some ways be adopted, they need to be well-thought
out to avoid unintended consequences. The use of a monetary threshold for investigating
complaints is problematic for several reasons. First, there is often wide variation between the
initial complaints of complainants and their actual entitlements. Complainants often underesti ate thei e pe ie e of E“ iolatio , a d upo a E“O s i estigatio s additional
entitlement are often found to be owing. In short, the actual monetary value of a complaint can
only be determined through investigation. Moreover, if the MOL were to only investigate
complaints with claims of monetary violations above a certain dollar value, many employers
would likely receive the message that only very large violations are considered serious by the
MOL. It would also risk penalizing vulnerable employees in precarious jobs characterized by low
wages who may be less able to navigate the small claims court or OLRB systems without
support.
A means of processing complaints that is consistent with the strategic enforcement paradigm
would be building on the MOL s high le el of su ess ith e pa ded i estigatio s, a d
improving the use of complaints as a resource that can provide information about violations
and inform MOL practices.
Additionally, special handling measures could be adopted for complaints that come from
complainants in industries that are under represented among the complaints received by the
MOL, or known to be industries in which employees experience difficulties exercising voice.
Using complaints in this way is a key plank of the strategic enforcement paradigm.172
Option 6: Adopt other options for expediting investigation and/or resolution of complaints
The timely resolution of ES violations is critical for employees who come forward with
complaints. Delays in assessing ES complaints serve as a powerful disincentive to exercising
voice, especially for vulnerable employees in precarious jobs. Without further detail on what
such options for expediting complaints would be, it is not possible for us to provide any
recommendation. Nevertheless, in general, recent efficiency-based reforms to complaints
handing and resolution have had a number of consequences. For example, the requirement for
complainants to first contact their employer introduced under the OBA was intended to lighten
the administrative burden on the MOL by encouraging early resolution between employees and
employers. But there is evidence (albeit largely associative) to suggest that this reform may be
preventing aggrieved employees from reaching out to the MOL given the new opportunities for
reprisal created by the self-resolution requirement, and possibly be resulting in an increase in
172
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the share of complaints that contain a reprisal claim.173 Such claims are often difficult and timeconsuming to investigate, a fact reflected in the practice, adopted by MOL officials, of
automatically escalating complaints with a reprisal component to ESO 2s.
Another recent initiative aiming to expedite complaint resolution is the increasing use of
settlements. As the following Section 5.5.5.2 discusses in more detail, they too tend to entail
several problematic trade-offs including often substandard outcomes for employees.
The MOL s experience with efficiency-based reforms to complaints handing and resolution
suggests that they can have problematic effects, especially for vulnerable employees in
precarious employment. Careful consideration should thus be given to the possible effects
flowing from attempts to expedite claims handling and resolution.
Option 7: Develop other strategic enforcement options
We recommend the development of other strategic enforcement practices that target firms at
the top of industry structures whose policies and practices shape workplace practices down the
supply chain by sub-contractors, franchisees, subsidiary corporations etc. This approach aims to
utilize the monitoring and compliance mechanisms that are already in place in these
organizational arrangements and networks. We have addressed the issue of expanding the
scope of liability in our responses to the options posed in Section 5.2.2 and reiterate that it is an
essential precondition for improving strategic enforcement.
The hot goods provisions of the FLSA (s. 15(a)(1) and 12(a)) exemplifies another strategic
enforcement option. Under these provisions, it is illegal for goods to be shipped in interstate
commerce if they were produced under conditions that violate the overtime or minimum wage
provisions of the Act. With the rise of just-in-time production, the potential costs imposed on
manufacturers through these provisions have increased. For this reason, in recent years, the
WHD has revived their use, and now enters into monitoring agreements with manufacturers
that have faced an embargo of their goods due to the non-compliance of sub-contractors.174
Enforcement tools enabling the MOL to embargo goods manufactured in violation of the ESA
should similarly be adopted.
Strong and appropriate deterrence tools, as discussed below, are also central to effective
proactive enforcement strategies.
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5.5.5.2 Use of Settlements
Background:
The ESA allows complainants to settle their complaints or to settle during a review by the OLRB.
As noted above, the use of settlements in the complaints process has been increasing since
2008/09. Settlements are divided into two types: non-facilitated and facilitated settlements.
Non-facilitated175 settlements can occur at any point after the complaint is filed and a written
agreement must be provided to the ESO outlining the agreement. Facilitated settlements176
were introduced under the OBA in 2010. Facilitated settlements involve the ESO as an
agreement facilitator between the employee and the employer. The growing use of settlements
can be explained by the increased use of non-facilitated settlements which have almost
doubled since 2008/09.177 Complaints resolved through facilitated settlements have remained
relatively steady since their introduction in 2010.
The use of settlements in minimum standards enforcement regimes merits special
consideration for several reasons. Some scholars have raised concerns about their use because
settlements potentially involve the negotiation of minimum standards instead of their
enforcement, which may lead employees to accept less than their legal entitlement.178 The use
of settlements potentially allows for the contracting out of ES,179 and can turn questions of law
enforcement into matters of dispute resolution.180 Furthermore, research investigating
developments in ES in other Canadian jurisdictions shows that settlements can reproduce the
power imbalances of the employment relationship, with employees subject to pressure to
ag ee to su sta da d te s f o e plo e s ho ofte ha e legal a d hu a esou es
representation throughout the settlement process. Commenting on the formalization of the ES
settle e t p o ess i B itish Colu ia, Fai e o ludes that, [ ]e ause of i ala e i the
power relationship between employees and their employers the new formalized mediation and
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settlement agreement process effectively places employees in a more vulnerable position,
e ei i g less p ote tio tha as p e iousl the ase. 181
Overall, settlements tend to be used for complaints with slightly higher value claims,
particularly those between $2,000 and $10,000. In terms of the standards claimed, settlements
are used disproportionately to resolve complaints with a claim for overtime pay, public holiday
pay, and reprisals. Not surprisingly, settlements are more prominent in relation to employers
who are still in operation.182
The e is o assess e t of the o plai a t s legal e title e t he settle e ts o u . As a
result, settlement outcomes can only be assessed in relation to the total claim amount, and
compared to the validated entitlement in assessed cases. For employees overall, settlements
yield a smaller percentage of the total initial claim amount compared to those assessed by an
ESO (this analysis does not take into account complaints denied by an ESO, presumably some
complaints that were settled may have been denied if they were assessed). Furthermore, in
almost 40% of cases, facilitated settlements are settled for less than half of an employee's total
initial claim, while fewer than 30% of non-facilitated settlements are settled for less than half of
an employee's total initial claim.183
As alluded to previously, another area where settlements occur is at the OLRB when complaints
are reviewed. Settlements are an important dispute resolution mechanism to manage case
load, but the settlement process must be designed to limit the opportunity for strategic
behaviour that allows one party to gain unfair leverage over the other. Not counting withdrawn
applications, almost 80% of reviews are resolved through settlement.184 Employers and
employees are more likely to settle than directors. With respect to employer-initiated reviews
of monetary orders, settlements produce far worse outcomes for employees than when these
reviews are adjudicated. Almost 30% of employees receive no money when employer-initiated
reviews are reviewed, compared to 14% for adjudicated reviews.185 Only 6% of employees
receive full reimbursement when employer-initiated reviews are settled. However, when these
reviews are adjudicated, 56% of employees receive 100% of what was ordered. Problematically,
fo e plo ees, adjudi ated e ie s t pi all uphold a E“O s de isio
% of the ti e hi h
means employees are frequently foregoing some part of their entitlement as a cost of getting a
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settlement.186 Employees fare better when employee applications for review of denials are
settled. In these situations, employees are more likely to receive some money compared to
adjudicated reviews.
The Interim Report sets out three options for reforming the settlement process under the ESA.
Option 1: Maintain the status quo
Should the status quo be maintained, the use of settlements would likely continue to increase
and employees would continue to settle for less money than they might otherwise be entitled.
At the OLRB level, settlements would likely continue to be encouraged as they represent a costeffective way to manage the applications and reduce pressure on scarce adjudicatory
resources. Research by Closing the Enforcement Gap shows that the best interest of
employees is not being addressed by the current settlement process, at both the complaints
and the OLRB review levels. For these reasons, we do not recommend option 1.
Option 2: In addition to the current requirement that all settlements be in writing, provide that
they be subsequently validated by the employee in order to be binding. For example, provide
that a settlement is binding only if, within a defined period after entering into the settlement,
the employee provides written confirmation of her or his willingness to settle on the terms
agreed to and acknowledges having had an opportunity to seek independent advice
While this option would move to ensure that employees are not forced or pressured into
settling, a worthy objective, it assumes that employees have access to independent advice. The
MOL currently does not provide government or quasi-government funded assistance for
employees who have had their rights violated.187 There are few options available for low
income earners to access legal support. Many employees who are reliant on the MOL for
enforcing minimum labour standards are already disadvantaged compared to unionized
employees. Non-unionized employees who must file their complaints with the MOL are also
often disadvantaged due to gender relations, gendered divisions of labour, immigration status,
and non-permanent employment status.188 For these reasons, we do not recommend option 2
as this option would only be viable if employees had meaningful access to the support and
ad i e of o ke s e t es a d o ke s ad o ates i a igati g the MOL complaints process,
especially those who are earning low wages and cannot afford adequate legal support. 189
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Option 3: Have more legal or paralegal assistance for employees in the settlement process at
the OLRB as set out below in Section 5.5.6
We recommend option 3 as access to legal assistance would help rectify considerable power
imbalances between employers and employees by augmenting supports for the latter to more
closely approximate those accessed by the former. Currently, low wage employees have few
options for obtaining legal support. As settlements typically produce less favourable outcomes
for employees, having access to legal or paralegal assistance would be beneficial. Complainants
who have more support, or who are better informed, or who are stronger willed and therefore
better able to persist in the process may do better in settlements. Employees need to be
protected in the settlement process so as to avoid arrangements that fall below minimum
entitlements. As such, there needs to be more legal or paralegal assistance for employees in the
settlement process. Access to legal or paralegal assistance during the OLRB review process
would be beneficial as almost 80% of reviews that are not withdrawn are settled and
employees rarely recover their full entitlement amount when settling.190 When employerinitiated reviews of monetary orders are settled, only 6% of employees receive their full
entitlement amount. However, when these reviews are adjudicated, almost 60% receive their
full entitlement amount.191 Improving and creating more access to legal support through either
the Office of the Worker Advisor or through Pro Bono Assistance is desirable, especially for
vulnerable employees in precarious jobs who have no other access to legal support.

5.5.5.3 Penalties and Remedies
Background:
The MOL s enforcement system uses remedies and penalties as compliance and deterrence
measures.192 Compliance measures include Compliance Orders,193 Orders to Pay Wages194 (for
employers, directors, and related employers), and Orders to Compensate and/or Reinstate.195
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Deterrence tools include Notices of Contravention,196 Part I tickets197 or summonses and Part III
prosecutions under the Provincial Offences Act (POA). It is useful to atego ize the MOL s a ge
of remedies and penalties in this way, because compliance and deterrence theories are based
on fundamentally different assumptions about the causes of legal violations and their
normative significance.198 Applied to questions of workplace regulation, deterrence theory is
premised on the idea that a substantial proportion of ES violations, including non-payment of
wages, are caused by the intentional or reckless actions of employers who have determined
they are better off not complying with their legal obligations or are not motivated to take
reasonable steps to understand their ESA obligations and make sure they are ESA compliant.
The efo e, the goal of the la should e to alte e plo e s eha io
aisi g the isk of ei g
caught and/or increasing the penalties for breaching the law. An emphasis on this goal will
generate specific and general deterrence thereby shaping the future behavior of both the
employer found to be in violation and of employers generally.199 From the perspective of
deterrence theory, wage violations should not be treated as a private problem resolved by
compensating the individual for her or his loss, but rather should be viewed as a serious social
hazard that not only harms individual employees and their dependents but that also
contributes to a climate in which processes of evasion, erosion and abandonment could lead to
a gloves-off labor market in which public decency is sacrificed to the drive to maximize profits
at any cost.
In contrast, compliance theory is premised on the idea that violations are the result of
employer ignorance and incompetence rather than intentional behavior.200 The primary
st ateg fo i p o i g e plo e s pe fo a e of thei legal o ligatio s, the efo e, is to
provide information and compliance assistance on the assumption that most employers will
respond by becoming law abiding citizens.201 Indeed, in particularly optimistic versions of
compliance theory, employers will go beyond the minimum that is required and a culture of
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compliance will foster even higher standards of behavior.202 The few bad apples that do not
respond to compliance measures will then be isolated and subject to deterrence measures. This
approach is seen to be particularly appropriate in the employment context, where regulations
apply to individuals and corporations engaged in beneficial economic activities.
A central problem underlying O ta io s E“ e fo e e t s ste is that it p i ileges o plia e
(and its account of violations and appropriate remedies) while evidence suggests that reckless,
wilful and egregious ES violations are much more prevalent than compliance logic admits. A
growing body of research on the changing nature of employment provides grounds to question
the salience of the compliance model.203 Weil and others204 demonstrate that, in many sectors
of the economy, employment relations have been transformed through a process of fissuring
which leads businesses to avoid having employees through contracting out, franchising and the
use of extended supply chains. Employment is being pushed into increasingly competitive
environments where employers are under enormous pressure to reduce costs, and since labor
costs often comprise a considerable portion of total costs in these industries the incentive to
violate the law grows, resulting in a greater propensity to engage in reckless or intentional
violations.
MOL administrative data further underscores the inadequacy of compliance approaches, and
the need to augment deterrence. The fact that complainants with claims for monetary ES
violations are concentrated in highly fissured industries as well as in small firms suggests that
ignorance may not be the driving factor behind many violations. Moreover, what we know
about the features of validated monetary claims indicate further that intentional, even
egregious violations are much more common than the compliance framework acknowledges.
Unpaid wages are the most common claim type filed by complainants. Their significance is
notable because the claim of unpaid wages is arguably less likely than other standards (i.e.
vacation pay or public holiday pay) to be caused by a mistake on the part of the employer.
Furthermore, the median amount of validated entitlements are for high dollar amounts that
represent a substantial portion of weekly or monthly earnings for low income earners. Pointing
toward employer recalcitrance in the enforcement process, employers are more likely to
voluntarily comply with lower dollar value complaints than high ones, and only a minority of
monetary orders is ever fully satisfied.
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I sho t, the e is a disju tu e et ee the MOL s o plia e-oriented enforcement
framework and both e plo ees e pe ie e of iolatio s a d of e plo e eha io i the
complaints process. The following discussion of options set forth by the Special Advisors
proceeds on the premise that deterrence measures need to be strengthened to rebalance the
MOL s a ge of remedies and penalties.
Option 1: Maintain the status quo
We do not recommend option 1 because deterrence measures are used too infrequently, and
because the penalties typically imposed from their use is sufficiently low enough for employers
to regard them as a cost of doing business. We know that only a tiny fraction of violations are
ought to the MOL s atte tio , a d that the ast ajo it of employers will not be subject to a
proactive inspection. The lack of risk of getting caught, coupled with the general weakness of
deterrence measures, mean that unscrupulous employers have little incentive to refrain from
ES violations.
The first levels of deterrence, NOCs and Part I tickets, are rarely used. Assuming that they are
not being issued in the same cases, adding together the number of NOCs and tickets issued
each year, these low-level deterrence measures were used in 4.6% of all cases with violations
and 5.1% of all cases with monetary violations between 2012/13 and 2014/15.205
The dollar amounts associated with NOCs are low. The penalty for a first contravention is $250,
for a second contravention in a three-year period it is $500, and for a third or subsequent
contravention in a three-year period it is $1,000 (set out in Ontario Regulation 289/01). If the
contravention affects more than one employee, and is not for a violation of a posting or recordkeeping requirement, the fine is multiplied by the number of employees.
The penalty associated with Part I tickets is also low. Currently, it is $295 for every violation,
with a victim fine surcharge and an administrative fee bringing the total to $360. Such low
dollar values do not provide enough of a monetary penalty to substantially dis-incentivize noncompliance among many employers. Their inadequacy is especially evident given that the
median total entitlement owed to complainants across the years from 2008/09 and 2014/15
was $1,109.206
Part III prosecutions carry much heavier penalties. If convicted, defendants are liable to be fined
up to $50,000 or imprisoned for up to 12 months. Corporations are liable to be fined up to
205
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$100,000 for a first offence, $250,000 for a second offence and $500,000 for a third or
subsequent offence. However, Part III prosecutions are used extremely infrequently. In the
period between 2008/09 and 2014/15, there were 92 businesses prosecuted for ES violations
under the POA, involving 292 charges.207 For the three years for which complete data are
available (2012/13 to 2014/15), 41 prosecutions were launched, comprising roughly 0.18% of
cases with violations detected by complaints and inspections (0.20% of cases with detected
monetary violations).208 Moreover, the average fine per business was $20,388, while the
average penalty per charge was $7,740.209 This average penalty per charge is only 15% of the
$50,000 maximum penalty for individuals, and 8% of the maximum of $100,000 for
corporations (for a first offence).210
The status quo also implies that Ontario will fall further behind other jurisdictions that are
ramping up deterrence measures in ways that inject genuine risk into ES violations. A number
of U.S. jurisdictions have implemented penalties such as licence debarment (California, Cook
County Illinois, Seattle, Jersey City, and Philadelphia, among others) and increased fines (New
York State, California).
Option 2: Increase the use of Part III prosecutions under the POA particularly for repeat or
intentional violators and where there is non-payment of an Order
We recommend an increase in the use of Part III prosecutions as part of a broader effort to
elevate the deterrence aspects of enforcement. As shown above, Part III prosecutions are used
very infrequently. They should also continue to be widely publicized to augment their general
deterrence effect.
As evidence of pervasive non-compliance with Ministry Orders, between 2009/10 and 2014/15,
only 39%211 of monetary orders (Orders to Pay Wages, Orders to Compensate/Reinstate) were
satisfied fully. For this reason, option 2 would need to be accompanied by other measures
greatly increasing compliance with Orders so that the pool of employers in violation of Orders
and potentially subject to Part III prosecution is reduced.
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The MOL recently initiated a Repeat Offenders/Zero-tole a e litz, in force between
September 1 and October 31,
. The MOL s a ou e e t of the i itiati e i di ates that
epeat iolatio s a e o e i di ato of i te tio al o ilful o - o plia e. 212 The MOL does
not indicate what deterrent penalties, if any, would be levied against employers with repeat
violations. However, consideration could be given to how the Repeat Offenders/Zero-tolerance
blitz could identify employers for Part III Prosecution.
Option 3: Increase the frequency of use of NOCs by the ES Program. This could be supported by:
1. requiring employers to pay an amount equal to the administrative monetary
penalty into trust in order to have a NOC reviewed by the OLRB;
2. re o i g the re erse o us pro isio that applies to the Dire tor of E ploy e t
Standards when a NOC is being reviewed at the OLRB.
As mentioned above, NOCs are under-utilized by the MOL. Between 2009/10 and 2014/15,
there were almost 46,000 complaints which detected a violation. In about half of those cases
(48%), the employer did not voluntarily comply, but in only 392 instances, or 1% of all
complaints with violations, were NOCs issued.213
Sub-options 1 and 2 aim to make the issuance of NOCs easier by limiting or streamlining their
review at the OLRB. Yet, it should be noted that employers infrequently seek to have NOCs
reviewed by the OLRB (only 10% of NOCs stemming from complaints, 4% of NOCs stemming
from inspections; perhaps reflecting the small stakes generally involved).214 A high percentage
of employers apparently do not pay the NOC penalty. Only 51% of complaint NOCs and 68% of
inspection NOCs are satisfied. Between 2012/13 and 2014/15 only 50% of $125,000 in NOC
penalties assessed in relation to complaints and investigations have been recovered.215
A better way of streamlining the use of NOCs is to require that they be issued for all confirmed
violations of listed ESA provisions, such as those involving monetary issues.
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Option 4: Require employers to pay a financial penalty as liquidated damages to the employee
whose rights it has contravened, designed to compensate for costs incurred because of the
failure to pay (i.e. borrowing costs), in a specified amount or an amount that is equal to or
double the amount of unpaid wages and a set amount for non-monetary contraventions
Liquidated damages are expressly intended to be compensatory rather than deterrent. They
reflect the fact that monetary violations can impose severe hardship on employees, who often
must resort to credit cards, or loans from friends and family. However, the secondary deterrent
effect of liquidated damages has also been recognized by the courts.216 For this reason, they are
a useful easu e that should e adopted as pa t of the MOL s e fo e e t s ste . The eed
for liquidated damages to be set at a rate that provides meaningful compensation for the
complainant is recognized in the U.S. context. The FLSA allows a court to assess liquidated
damages in the amount equal to the unpaid wages or unpaid overtime pay.217 The New York
State Wage Theft Prevention Act, which took effect in 2011, increased the amount of liquidated
damages available to employees who prevail in pursuing a complaint involving claims of
monetary violations from 25% of the back wages owed to 100% in addition to other civil
penalties and interest.218 Treble damages allowing for three times the amount of actual
financial loss to employees are available to aggrieved employees in a number of U.S. States. 219
U de the Dist i t of Colu ia s Wage Theft Prevention Amendment Act of 2014 employees can
be awarded damages that are three times the back wages owed, in addition to the back wages,
so that total restitution is essentially quadruple damages.220 Such measures reflect growing
awareness that liquidated damages should be enough to make the complaint process
worthwhile for complainants and deterrent for employers.
Option 5: Increase the dollar value of NOCs
Increasing the dollar value of NOCs is another measure that would augment the deterrent
effect of NOCs. Currently set at $250 for the first contravention, $500 for a second, and $1000
for a third, the dollar value of NOCS are too low to be sufficiently deterrent. Moreover, the
preference among ESOs is to impose lower value NOCs. About three quarters of NOCs are for
216
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the lowest amount, $250.221 In about a quarter of cases, the fine is for more than $250, either
because multiple employees were affected or it was a second or subsequent offence.222
Therefore, we recommend greater dollar value penalties for NOCs.
Option 6: Increase the administrative fee payable when a restitution order is made, to include
the costs of investigation and inspections
In principle, we recommend option 6 because it shifts costs related to ESA enforcement from
tax payers to those who have violated the ESA. The option should be considered along with
other measures that create new revenue streams to support strengthened enforcement.
However, if it is adopted, precautions should be taken to ensure that it does not place ESOs
under increased pressure to issue Compliance Orders when restitution orders are warranted.
Option 7: Use the existing authority of officers to require employers to post notices in the
workplace where contraventions are found in claim investigations
The posting of notices of violations in workplaces is an important way of raising awareness
among employees of potential violations. However, other jurisdictions are going further;
specifically, they are authorizing inspectorates to post a summary of violations in a place that is
visible to the public. For example, the New York State Wage Theft Prevention Act allows the
state s Depa t e t of La o to post a oti e of iolatio fo up to da s i a pu li pla e i
the case of employers found to have engaged in willful violations of ES.223 In California, the
Employee Misclassification Act (SB 459), passed in 2011, requires that any employer found to
have willfully misclassified employees post a notice on their website or another prominent
place if there is no website, indicating the employer has engaged in employee misclassification
and that the employer has changed its workplace practice to comply with the law.224 Such
transparency-based measures have been adopted successfully in other realms of regulation; for
example, public health inspectorates often post restaurant hygiene grades that warn the public
of restaurant infractions.225 Indeed, they are powerful measures because they mobilize
p essu e o
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Option 8: Have the Director of Employment Standards set interest rates pursuant to the
authority to do so in section 88(5) so that interest can be awarded in the circumstances
currently allowed for
In principle, this option has merit, but a mandatory requirement for employers to pay interest
on unpaid wages (option 9) is preferable from the perspective of augmenting deterrence
measures in the ESA (see justification under response to option 9 below).
Option 9: Amend the Act to allow employers to be required to pay interest on unpaid wages
Many jurisdictions require interest to be paid on unpaid wages along with other civil penalties.
In Ontario, as elsewhere, pre-judgement and post-judgement interest is routinely included in
remedies issued in small claim court judgements. Such a measure is justified in light of the
substantial time and resources complainants must spend trying to obtain the wages and
entitlements they have earned.227 Requiring interest also reduces the chance that employers
gain financial advantages from withholding what are often large sums of money for long
periods of time. For these reasons, we recommend option 9.
Option 10: Make access to government procurement contracts conditional on a clean ESA
record
Incorporating ES compliance provisions into public procurement policy is a well-established
means of promoting enforcement, and one of growing popularity.228 Indeed, the incorporation
of ES clauses in procurement contracts reflects a belief that ES are a public good and their
enforcement is a fundamental public policy goal and, hence, that government should not be
rewarding unscrupulous employer with its business.229 One prominent example is the embrace
of such mechanisms i the u
ella g oup the “ eatf ee Pu hasi g Co so tiu , an
organization comprised of state and local governments in the United States who help other
cities, states, counties, towns, and school districts to develop and implement policies and rules
towards the goal of avoiding sweatshop products. The Consortium works to assist governments
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in creating codes of conduct, applicable to the contracts in which they engage, requiring that
thei o t a to s a ide
sta da ds that e jo i ternational consensus and the will of the
people of the atio a d egio of p odu tio , spe ifi all , the o e o e tio s of the
International Labour Organization and its Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work and its implementation and monitoring.230 A othe e a ple is Cook Cou t s wage theft
ordnance, which renders any employer found to have willfully or repeatedly violated any
federal or state laws governing the payment of wages in the previous five years ineligible for
county contracts. Applicants for contracts must submit an affidavit confirming compliance, and
a procurement officer can issue a notice of default if an existing contractor is found to have
violated ES.231 For these reasons, we recommend option 10.
Option 11: Grant the OLRB jurisdiction to impose administrative monetary penalties
We recommend this option only if it is adopted as a supplement to, rather than a substitute for,
existing deterrence measures. Establishing a new type of sanction does not address the
fundamental problem of the underutilization of existing deterrence measures.

5.5.7 Recovery/Collections
Background:
A key component of ES enforcement is recovering any monies that are owed. Such activities
have traditionally been the central purpose of the MOL s o plai ts s ste . To collect
monetary entitlements for employees, the MOL has a number of tools at its disposal. First,
employees are encouraged to attempt to resolve complaints with their employer. If selfresolution is not possible and an employee files a complaint, another set of measures come into
play. I the ase of e plo e s ith o histo of iolatio s, o ith p e ious iolatio s of
diffe e t sta da ds, E“Os a e ge e all e ou aged to seek olu ta o plia e. If voluntary
compliance is not achieved, an ESO can issue monetary orders.232 At any point in the process,
the complainant and their employer can agree to settle.233
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Data show that when employers agree to voluntary compliance, employees receive their
entitlements. However, when the MOL resorts to monetary orders, the rate of recovery drops
dramatically since only a minority of employers comply with orders to pay. The MOL s
challenges in recovering monetary orders represent a fundamental weakness in its
enforcement system, one that erodes all other aspects of enforcement. Enhancements to the
a essi ilit of the o plai ts p o esses, o effo ts to i ease e plo ees a a e ess of thei
workplace rights, are of limited value if those employees who assume the risk of coming
forward wind up with little more than paper victories. Such low rates of recovery of monetary
orders implicitly suggest to employers that they will not face severe consequences if they
choose to ignore the MOL.
In the following, we provide an assessment of the options set forth in the Interim Report.
Option 1: Maintain the status quo
The recovery rates of monetary orders are far too low to accept as the status quo that ought
to be maintained. When all complaints with a monetary order during the period between
2009/10 and 2014/15 are considered, only 39% were fully satisfied.234 The median total
entitlement of unpaid monetary orders during these years was $1,597,235 a large amount of
money for low-income earners.
Trends in complaints point to other dimensions of the recovery challenge. The most common
claim included in complaints are unpaid wages,236 and these are also the least likely to be
recovered through monetary orders.237 Employees who work in small firms (fewer than 20
employees) are vastly over-represented among complainants. From 2012/13 to 2014/2015,
they accounted for 48.5% of complaints received by the Ministry.238 Yet employees in small
firms are much less likely than employees in large firms to recover monetary entitlements
through orders to pay. Firms employing 19 or fewer employees accounted for 76% of
unsatisfied orders to pay between 2009/10 and 2014/15.239
Moreover, the status quo does not appear to be a static situation. There is evidence that
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recovery difficulties are getting worse for the MOL. The data show that rates of full recovery
deteriorated between 2010/11 and 2014/15. Whereas in 2010/11, 50.5% of complaints with
any order to pay wages resulted in an unpaid order, in 2014/15 that figure stood at 63.6%.240
For these reasons, we do not recommend option 1.
Option 2: Amend the ESA to allow collection processes to be streamlined and to provide
additional collection powers in order to increase the speed and rate of recovery of unpaid
orders. This measure could include incorporating some of the collections-related provisions in
the Retail Sales Tax Act – which is another statute under which the MOF collects debts – into the
ESA, such as:
1. removing the administrative requirement to file a copy of the Order in court in
order for reditors’ re edies to e ade a aila le;
2. creating authority for warrants to be issued and/or liens to be placed on real and
personal property;
3. pro idi g the authority to o sider so eo e lia le for a de tor’s de t if he/she is
the re ipie t of the de tor’s assets, i order to pre e t de tors fro a oidi g
their ESA debt by transferring assets to a family member.
Each of these measures represents an improvement on the current situation as each would
increase the recovery of unpaid wages, and they are therefore recommended. There is no
justification for why the ESA lacks the recovery mechanisms available to the government in
other legal contexts such as the Retail Sales Tax Act. Numerous states allow for post-judgement
wage liens.241 For example, changes to the California Labor Code that took effect in January
allo the state s La o Co
issio e to pla e a lie o a e plo e s p ope t , i luding
bank accounts or accounts receivable, if a final judgement against that employer is not paid.242
Studies point to a number of limits of post-judgement liens, however. In situations where an
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employer has hidden assets during the investigation, where an e plo e s assets a e not easily
identified, or in situations of bankruptcy, post-judgements are often not effective.243
Option 3: Amend the ESA to allo the Mi istry to i pose a age lie o a e ployer’s property
upon the filing of an employment standards claim for unpaid wages
A pre-judgement wage lien would provide a powerful mechanism for reducing the nonpayment of monetary orders – we therefore recommend this option. In the United States, the
states of Wisconsin and Maryland allow for pre-judgement wage liens to be filed against
employers. The chief benefit of pre-judgement liens over post-judgement liens is that they
prevent employers from disposing or hiding assets during the time a complaint is being
investigated. For example, if the Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development believes
that a e plo e s assets a e at isk of ei g li uidated hile a age complaint is being
i estigated, it has the a ilit to file a lie agai st the e plo e s p ope t . O e stud
determined that, between 2005 and 2015, 79 of the 98 cases (80%) in which the Department
brought suit to enforce the lien resulted in full or partial payment (a very high percentage given
that these were all cases in which assets were determined to be at risk).244 Additionally, the
stud s authors suggest that the mere possibility of a wage lien serves to deter monetary
violations among employers.
Option 4: Require employers who have a history of contraventions or operate in sectors with a
high non-compliance rate to post bonds to cover future unpaid wages
Wage bonds are another option that would increase the recovery of back wages for employees
in sectors where monetary violations are common and are, therefore, recommended. Such
measures have a long history in industries such as construction and agriculture, but they are
increasingly being proposed as a mechanism to combat monetary violations in other sectors. A
recent example of their use is the new wage bond requirement for the nail salon industry in
New York City. Effective July 2015, every salon must secure a wage bond or an insurance policy
to cover wages as a condition of licencing. The coverage required varies by the number of
individuals employed: between $25 000 USD for salons that employ 2 to 5 individuals to $75
000 USD if a salon employs 26 or more. The premium charged to employers is roughly 2% to 3%
of the amount of the bond. Department of State investigators may inspect salons and require
243
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proof of coverage, and levy fines between $500 and $2500 USD for employers with no
coverage.245
Option 4 is also consistent with the zero tolerance inspection blitz that the MOL introduced in
Fall 2016 – for all these reasons, we recommend its adoption.
Option 5: Establish a provincial wage protection plan
The establishment of a provincially-based fund to make up for any shortfalls in wages that result
from non-recovery would be the most certain way to insure that employees are paid their
monetary entitlements under the ESA. A fund of this sort existed briefly in Ontario in the early
1990s but, as it used public revenue to compensate employees for lost wages, its source of
fu di g as iti ized fo allo i g e plo e s to so ialize the osts of usi ess failu e. 246 At
the federal level, the Wage Earner Protection Act compensates employees up to nearly $4,000
fo u paid ages, a atio , se e a e a d te i atio pa i the e e t of thei e plo e s
bankruptcy or entry into receivership.
While the design of a wage protection fund would require careful consideration, such a fund
would complement other efforts to strengthen recovery. We therefore recommend the
adoption of option 5.
Option 6: Provide the Ministry with authority to revoke the operating licences, liquor licences,
per its a d dri er’s li e es of those ho do ot o ply with orders to pay
This is another potentially powerful tool to bring to bear on employers who have not complied
with orders to pay, and is recommended. A growing number of jurisdictions in the United States
are implementing licensure debarment to combat monetary violations and to increase the
recovery of judgements. While not directly augmenting collections capacity, such measures do
serve to make non-compliance with judgments costly and risky for employers. In Jersey City,
New Jersey, under the recently passed Wage Theft Ordinance, the City Department responsible
for issuing a business licence (for example the Department of Health and Human Services in the
ase of a food se i e esta lish e t se ds a e uest to the state s Depa t e t of La o a d
Workforce Development for any wage complaint forms filed against a licence applicant.
Businesses with outstanding complaint forms will have 30 days to prove payment, or that they
have appealed the order. Failure to pay will result in business licence suspension.
Ne Yo k “tate E fo e e t Task Fo e
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In Cook County, Illinois, an employer found to have engaged in repeated or wilful violation of
state and federal wage laws in the past five years faces a number of penalties. Such employers
are ineligible to contract with Cook County, face business licensure revocation, are ineligible to
receive property tax incentives from the County, and may be required to pay back previous
incentives. When applying for business licences or tax incentives, the applicant must submit an
affidavit indicating that they have not violated federal or state wage-payment laws, including
the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, the Illinois Minimum Wage Act, the Illinois
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, the Employee Classification Act, the FLSA or
statutes or regulation of any state which governs the payment of wages. What is important
about these measures is that they make monetary violations and non-payment of judgements
potentially very costly for employers.
It bears mentioning, at this point, that any set of measures that aim to improve the recovery of
wages must include expanding the scope of liability for monetary orders (see Section 5.2.2 of
this brief). Wage recovery improvement efforts should entail the establishment of joint and
several liability for companies so that they are responsible for the ESA obligations of their subo t a to s. Di e to s lia ilit ould also e e pa ded e o d u paid ages a d a atio pa .
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Part II: Respo ses to Optio s Posed i Chapter o La our Relatio s
Perti e t to E ploy e t Sta dards
While Closi g the E fo e e t Gap p oje t is o e ed p i a il ith the ESA, reforms to
the LRA can have an impact not only on enforcement issues but also on standard-setting
itself. With regard to enforcement, unionized employees are required to use the arbitration
process to secure their ES entitlements. The scope of the unionized workforce, therefore, has
an impact on the level of state resources required for ES enforcement. Because our research is
not examining issues around the establishment of collective bargaining relationships, however,
we have chosen not to comment on those aspects of the Interim Report. Rather, we have
limited ourselves to commenting on options posed under the headings broader-based
bargaining since many of them would effectively set new minimum standards that would be
applicable across industries within a geographic region, supplanting lower ES entitlements. We
also consider briefly the issue of employee voice – the capacity to speak and be heard as a
member of the community of workers served by formal legal protections247 – as it pertains to
the most vulnerable employees in precarious employment.

4.6.1 Broader-Based Bargaining
Background:
In the face of the changing nature of employment, there is widespread recognition that the
current Wagner Act Model (WAM) of collective bargaining works poorly in the private sector. A
chief indicator of the inadequacy of the WAM is the declining rate of union density in the
private sector. As the Interim Report indicates, in Ontario the rate of unionization in the private
sector was 19.2% in 1997 but stood at 14.3% in 2015, a downward trend consistent across all
provinces and even more pronounced in other jurisdictions such as the U.S.248 There is also
growing understanding that, even if it is tweaked in some of the ways that are under
consideration in a variety of jurisdictions, including Ontario, it is unlikely that private sector
union density will increase particularly in sectors characterized by small workplaces and highly
competitive conditions. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms protects freedom of association
Vosko ‘ights ithout ‘e edies, p.
.
Mit hell a d Mu a , Cha gi g Wo kpla es ‘e ie , p. ; “ee also “tatisti s Ca ada, CAN“IM. Ta le
0078: Labour Force Survey Estimates (LFS), Employees by Union Status, Sex and Age Group, Canada and Provinces.
Online: http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a05 (Version current at September 20, 2016).
247

248

85

which the Supreme Court of Canada has nevertheless interpreted as protecting the right to
collective bargaining.249 Statutory collective bargaining regimes that do not provide employees
with a realistic opportunity to establish collective bargaining relationships with their employers
are thus constitutionally suspect.
In light of this recognition, in their Interim Report pose nine options for consideration, eight of
which are not mutually exclusive.
Option 1: Maintain the status quo
Given the proceeding rationale for the eight other options offered, we do not recommend the
option of maintaining the status quo.
That said, we do not think the WAM should be abandoned or repealed. Rather, we think it
should be reformed and remain generally available to employees who are able to organize
under its provisions. However, other models need to be introduced that can operate alongside
the WAM in those areas where WAM works poorly. We emphasize the necessity for pluralism
here.250 Because of the multiplicity of industry structures and work arrangements, it will be
necessary to adopt a multi-pronged approach. We therefore support the comment made in the
Interim Report251 that the options presented are not meant to be pursued in isolation and that
specialized regimes may need to be designed to work in specific contexts in which a large
number of vulnerable employees and precarious jobs are concentrated.
We also recognize that each of the options describes an ideal-typical model only and that much
would depend on its design details. We do not anticipate that the Special Advisors will be able
to address detailed design questions, but rather will consider the merits of the models. In that
spirit, our comments focus on the broad parameters of the models. However, the Special
Advisors may wish to consider making further suggestions about the process the government
should follow in further developing proposals to insure that the voice of those employees most
affected will be heard and taken into account.
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Option 2: Collective Agreement Extension
The collective agreement extension model was originally adopted in several Canadian provinces
during the Great Depression when excess competition was seen to be damaging to the
economy as a whole as well as to employers and employees. It was connected to a view that
the Depression was in part caused by an economic system in which there was underconsumption resulting from employees la k of a gai i g po e . Colle ti e ag ee e t
extension provided a system for reducing competition with an industry in a geographic sector
and enhancing e plo ees bargaining power by allowing a leading employer and a union to
negotiate a collective agreement that would be binding on the entire sector. The scheme also
facilitated unionization insofar as it reduced the concern that a unionized firm would be at an
economic disadvantage vis a vis its non-unionized competitors since they would be required to
pay the negotiated wage whether they were organized or not, but it also posed a challenge to
unions to demonstrate that employees would gain additional benefits by becoming
members.252
We recommend the revival of this model as part a multi-pronged initiative to provide
employees, otherwise subject only to minimum ES, with access to collective bargaining. It is a
sad irony that the organization of work in many industries has been restructured to push it out
from lead companies to small businesses with low barriers to entry that face intense
competition and rely on deskilled low-wage employees, precisely the conditions that collective
bargaining extension was designed to address.
Option 3: Franchise Bargaining
We also recommend this option, again as another arrangement that sits alongside others, to
address the specific problem of collective bargaining in franchise businesses. Under our current
model, it is possible that a franchisor might be found to be a related employer of its franchisees
but it would depend on the facts of each arrangement and franchise agreements could be
restructured slightly to avoid this result if a related employer application was successful. As a
result, under our current model, unions are required to organize and bargain with each
franchise or at best a group of franchisees in a local area. Under these conditions, unionization
is unlikely to occur and even if a bargaining unit was certified it would have so little bargaining
power that it would be unlikely to achieve improved terms that would make the effort and cost
of being unionized worthwhile. There is clearly a need for a different model.
Judy Fudge, Judy and Eric Tucker (2001) La our Before the La : Workers’ Colle ti e A tio a d the Ca adia
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The proposed model, involving location by location organizing but multi-location bargaining,
presumably with the franchisor, begins to move in the right direction, but more would need to
be done. For example, at the very least, it should be combined with the BC proposal253 (or a
variant thereof 254), discussed in option 4, to provide that once one agreement was reached
with the franchisor, newly organized locations of that franchisor would be attached to the
agreement. As well, more would need to be done to facilitate organizing since the task of
obtaining certifications for each location under the WAM would continue to be daunting if the
franchised business had many franchisees. Collective agreement extension, particularly with
regard to monetary terms, might be a particularly good solution in this context. Franchise
agreements could be revised to take into account standardized wage costs, while employees in
all locations would immediately get the benefit of the agreement. As well, the opposition of
franchisees to local unionization might be reduced.
Option 4: Sectoral Bargaining (BC Model)
We recommend the option of sectoral bargaining, but only on the understanding that the
details of any such scheme need to be carefully considered. In that spirit, we offer some
suggestions.
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One example of a similar model is the National Labor Relations Board expanded Joint Employer Standard.
Adopted in the case of Browning-Ferris Industries of California, INC, (32 NLRB No. 186 (2015) the standard expands
the criteria for determining joint employer status among firms for the purposes of collective bargaining. Whereas
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The BC model would be limited to designated sectors where employees have been historically
underrepresented by trade unions. It is questionable whether such a restriction is justified at
the present time, given that private sector union density in Ontario has dropped significantly
and stood at 14% in 2015.255 As a result, a focus on sectors that historically have been
underrepresented is no longer appropriate; the concern is with sectors that are currently at low
levels of unionization; in short, most of the private sector.
The model provides that the first union to organize in the sector would be eligible to apply for a
sectoral certificate and negotiate a standard agreement that would apply to bargaining units
subsequently certified in the sector. It seems to presuppose that the sector is currently union
free, which may not be the case, so that provision should be made for unions that may already
have bargaining units within the sector to act in a coordinated fashion, perhaps through a
council of unions. As well, the model provides that the sectoral agreement only applies to other
employers in the sector is their employees become certified bargaining units under the normal
provisions of WAM. While the existence of a sectoral agreement may make it easier for unions
to appeal to unorganized employees by pointing to what they will get, it still leaves employers
with a strong incentive to resist unionization if the current terms and conditions of employment
are lower than those in the sectoral agreement, thereby giving them a competitive advantage.
Collective agreement extension arguably provides a better model for getting employees
collective bargaining coverage than bargaining unit by bargaining unit accretion.
Option 5: Sectoral Bargaining: Multi-Employer Certification
We recommend the goal of achieving collective bargaining coverage for an entire sector, but
are concerned that the requirement that a union or council of unions demonstrate majority
support of all employees in that sector through an election creates an impossible barrier.
Employers already enjoy significant advantages over unions in certification elections and the
research has shown that elections significantly reduce the likelihood of union success compared
to card count certifications. Even in single workplace elections, unions face significant barriers
in identifying the eligible voters and in getting access to them, whereas the employers have this
information at their fingertips and can have easy access to employees at work and influence
over them by virtue of the unequal power relations that the Supreme Court of Canada
recognizes are inherent in employment.256 The difficulty of conducting a successful election
campaign among all employees in a defined sector, many of whom may be in workplaces where
there are no inside organizers, is likely to make this model unworkable.
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Mitchell a d Mu a , Cha gi g Wo kpla es ‘e ie , p. .
Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.) [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313.
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Option 6: Employer Initiated Broader-Based Bargaining
Frankly, we doubt there will be any demand from employers to compel the negotiation of
sectoral agreements. As the Interim Report recognizes, employers have pressed for increasingly
decentralized bargaining and have withdrawn from voluntary sectoral bargaining where it
existed and broken pattern bargaining.
Option 7: Create Unique Models of Bargaining for Specific Industries
In general, we recommend this option. As we noted in the introduction to our comments, a
plurality of arrangements is needed to address the diverse industry structures that have been
created. However, the need for unique regimes could be lessened by the adoption of sectoral
bargaining models such as collective agreement extension that could operate in a wide range of
circumstances.
Option 8: Bargaining Models for Freelancers based on the Status of the Artist Act (SAA)
There are many positive features of the federal SAA, but if the province is going to move in that
direction it should also address its limitations.257
On the positive side, the SAA model enables groups of workers who are otherwise excluded
from collective bargaining because they are independent contractors by any legal definition.
Therefore, not only are they not covered by other statutory collective bargaining schemes, but
it may also be a violation of the Competition Act for them to act collectively in the market.
Second, the negotiation of scale agreements effectively establishes a minimum standard for
those covered, but does not preclude the ability of individuals to negotiate for higher
compensation. Third, artists associations gain bargaining rights by showing they are the most
representative; they need not demonstrate majority support.
On the negative side, the SAA model is narrowly limited to professional artists, so that any new
legislation would have to have broader application if it were to provide freelancers more
generally with access to collective bargaining. Second, the federal legislation permits producers
to form associations and have them accredited for the purposes of representing the industry in
collective bargaining with artist association, but it does not require them to do so. As a result, it
does not generally operate as a model of sectoral bargaining. Rather, artists associations must
Ma Phe so , Eliza eth
Colle ti e a gai i g fo i depe de t o t a to s: Is the status of the a tist a t a
model fo othe i dust ial se to s? Canadian Labour & Employment Law Journal 7(3): 335–389; Cranford et al,
Self-Employed Workers Organize, Chapter 4.
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negotiate a separate scale agreement with each producer. To create a sectoral model of
collective bargaining, it would be necessary to follow the precedent of Quebec and require
producers to form associations to represent them in negotiations for the industry.
Option 9: Apply the LRA to the Media Industry
It is unclear what is entailed by this option, but to the extent that LRA provisions would
overcome rather than compound difficulties in the SAA, we recommend the adoption of this
option.

4.6.2 Employee Voice
Background:
Broader-based bargaining models, if adopted, should greatly extend collective bargaining
coverage and will likely increase trade union density. However, barring the enactment of a
model of compulsory union representation for all employees, there will remain a segment of
the labour force that does not have access to voice and unless strong measures are taken it is
likely going to be the case that this segment will be large, especially among the most vulnerable
employees in precarious employment. The Interim Report explores a number of options to
address this voice gap but the challenges are great.
Option 1: Maintain the status quo
The guiding principles of the review embrace the objective of providing workers with voice and
the Interim Report articulates the reasons for its importance. The status quo leaves most
private sector employees without an institutionalized or protected channel for the expression
of voice. Therefore, we do not recommend the option of maintaining the status quo.
Option 2: Minority Unionism
As Go ez s esea h epo t fo the CWR notes, one problem with any discussion of minority
unionism is that it does not have a clear definition. The core idea is that a minority union
represents its members only rather than all employees at a workplace or in a bargaining unit
within a workplace, but the meaning of that representation could vary from a requirement that
employers consult with minority unions to one in which they are obliged to bargain in good
faith over the terms of a collective agreement. Discussions of minority unionism are also

91

hampered by the fact that we do not have experience with this model in the North American
context and so there is an absence of empirical data on its potential impact. Instead, there have
been numerous efforts at model building based on normative principles.
This situation makes it challenging to comment on this option but we would like to raise some
concerns particularly around how minority unionism might operate for the most vulnerable
employees in the labour market, a central focus of the Interim Report. The fundamental
questions are whether these employees are likely to form minority unions and whether
minority unions of the most vulnerable are likely to be able to provide for worker voice in a
meaningful way.
With regard to the first question, we suspect there will be very little minority union formation
by vulnerable employees in precarious employment for many of the same reasons that such
workers they are not incorporated into majority unions under the WAM. The population of
employees that the Special Advisors define as vulnerable are likely to be particularly fearful of
retaliation for engaging in trade union activity of any kind, notwithstanding that the law
protects the right to organize. Such workers are also disproportionately employed in small
workplaces258 where minority unionism would seem to be particularly unrealistic (e.g., are we
going to have a union representing 10 employees in a workplace with 25?).
The second question goes to the effectiveness of a minority union representing workers at the
otto of the la ou a ket. If the a date of a i o it u io is to egotiate a e e s
only contract, it seems unlikely that such a union would have enough bargaining power to
achieve significantly improved terms and conditions of employment. Alternatively, if the role of
the minority union is more limited to having access to information and right to be consulted, it
may provide an avenue for employers to communicate but we do not anticipate that it will
provide for effective voice that will not only enable employees to express a view but also have
their views taken into account.
In sum, we are very dubious that minority unionism, in any of its variants, has much to offer for
vulnerable employees and therefore do not recommend the adoption of option 2.
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Option 3: Adopt an Institutional Mechanism for the Expression of Employee Interests in the
Plans and Policies of Employers
As is the case with minority unionism, the ambiguous nature of the option makes it difficult to
address except in a speculative way. The central question is whether a scheme of legislated
employee participation, such as a works council or a joint health and safety committee, can be
an effective vehicle for providing vulnerable employees with voice. Here again, we are
pessimistic and do not recommend investing time and energy in this option.
Employee participation schemes are designed to operate in larger workplaces, typically with
twenty or more employees, and require that worker representative have access to education,
training and institutional support (typically a union) in order for them to be effective
protagonists.259 Vulnerable employees in precarious employment are unlikely to be in this
situation. As a result, there is a substantial likelihood that these arrangements are more likely
to provide for employer voice than as vehicles for employees to voice their interests and have
them taken into account.
Option 4: Enact some variant of the models set out in the research report
This option is too ambiguous and open-ended for us to comment on.
Option 5: Protect concerted activity
Canadian labour law currently protects employees against retaliation for engaging in trade
union organizing and activity but does not protect employees from engaging in concerted
activity more generally.260 Thus, non-union employees who collectively approach their
employer to ask for an increase outside of any trade union organizing activity could be
terminated by being given notice. Similarly, non-unionized employees who participated in a
de o st atio outside thei e plo e s p e ises to de a d $ fo fai ess outside of the
context of a union organizing drive would not be protected. While legal protection alone may
Hall et al, Maki g a Diffe e e, p.
; Yassi, A alee et al
The Effe ti e ess of Joi t
Health a d “afet Co
ittees: A “ ste ati ‘e ie . American Journal of Industrial Medicine 56(4): 424-438.
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o e ted a ti it p ote tio s: [e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have
the ight to ef ai f o a o all of su h a ti ities…
An informative website developed by the NLRB that documents its rulings relevant to the issue of concerted
activity can be found here at: https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/protected-concerted-activity.
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not result in a significant increase in concerted activity by vulnerable employees who may lack
the institutional supports often needed for employees to feel confident they can make their
rights real, it is an aspect of freedom of association that ought to be protected by a statutory
right. We therefore recommend the adoption of option 5.
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